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ABSTRACT 
This thesis points to the important roles of learning, individual differences in emotional 
intelligence (EI) and general intelligence (IQ), and culture (British vs. South Asian), on task 
switching. Participants switched between word identities and colour and between different 
face dimensions (emotion, gender and occupation). In general switch costs were reduced as 
participants practiced. Most interestingly, Stroop interference across blocks of trials was 
stronger for stimuli that form integrated representations, providing evidence that learned 
bindings between word forms and colours influence Stroop effects. In a separate study, 
people with high IQ were generally better able to task-switch while EI had a selective effect 
depending on the task. Individuals with high EI had low switch costs when emotion 
classification was involved, but not when switches were made between gender and 
occupation decisions. In a third set of studies, culture was found to affect the speed of face 
categorization, which may reflect cultural biases to emotion (in the White British population) 
and unfamiliarity in using facial cues to gender in South Asian participants. Finally, there 
was also evidence of implicit coding of facial emotion and gender - but not occupation. The 
implications for understanding task switching were reviewed in a final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Human behavior needs to be highly flexible in order to cope with environmental challenges. 
This flexibility is based on complex cognitive control mechanisms that are required not only 
to filter information but also to operate appropriately to achieve task goals. The exploration 
of the cognitive mechanisms underlying flexible task performance has been an area of 
interest for researchers since the beginnings of cognitive psychology, and task switching has 
frequently been used as an experimental paradigm to explore the mechanisms of cognitive 
control.  
In task switching experiments, the participants perform two different tasks. 
Performance is generally slower on those trials when a task changes (switch trials), and it is 
faster when the task repeats (repeat trials), compared to when a trial is started for the first 
time – producing a switch cost (larger latencies and higher error rates for switch vs. repeat 
trials). This switch cost is generally asymmetric when the tasks are of unequal difficulty, 
producing the counter-intuitive finding of larger switch costs for the easier task. For 
example, with Stroop stimuli, reading the word RED printed in blue (response- red) is 
typically easier (faster & less error prone) than naming the colour in which the word is 
written (response-blue) (Stroop, 1935). Allport, Styles, and Hsieh (1994) presented Stroop 
words (e.g., RED printed in blue colour), neutral words for word reading (words printed in 
black colour), and neutral words for colour naming (strings of xs printed in five colours) and 
required participants to either read the word or name it’s colour, repeating or switching 
between two tasks on different trials. The results showed larger switch costs for word 
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reading than colour naming (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994, experiment 5) despite word 
reading being the easier task.  
Jersild (1927) reported the first task switching experiment. He presented a list of 2-
digit numbers in an alternating run to the subjects and the task was to subtract 3 from the 
first number, to add 6 to the next number, and so on down to the list in ABABAB...run (in an 
experimental/mixed list condition). In a control condition participants had to “subtract 3 
from every number” or “add 6 to every number” in AAAA/BBBB runs (the pure list 
condition). Switch costs were computed by subtracting the time taken to perform the non-
alternating lists from the time required to perform with the alternating list. The results 
showed that the participants took much longer to complete mixed lists than pure lists (i.e., 
there was a switch cost) which was 34% of the baseline time per item in the pure blocks. 
Applying the same paradigm, Spector and Biederman (1976) found switch costs of over 400 
ms per item while switching between adding 3 and subtracting 3 from two-digit numbers. 
In certain situations when the task switches and the participant has to respond to 
stimuli on the basis of changed stimulus-response rules [so called “task set rules” (Meiran, 
2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995)], a cost on reaction times can arise from the subsequent 
delay in selecting the appropriate (new) task-set rules (Mayr & Keele, 2000). Views on how 
flexible set rules can be instantiated and changed vary – from the idea that there is simply 
activation of the relevant rule (Rubinstein, Evans, & Meyer, 2001) through to the proposal 
that there need to be extra inhibitory processes, which minimize interference from competing 
“task-sets” (Mayr & Keele, 2000). There is evidence from neurological and neuroimaging 
studies that different mechanisms contribute to task-set selection and they are functionally 
independent: For example patients with focal lesions of the left inferior frontal cortex show 
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normal inhibition in the form of larger RTs to recently abandoned tasks but are still impaired 
at imposing new task sets; patients with right frontal cortex lesions can show the opposite 
pattern (Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivory, & Keele, 2006). Such results suggest a neurocognitive 
dissociation between selection and inhibition of task-sets in the prefrontal cortex - the 
activation of task-sets operates through the left prefrontal cortex (e.g., Brass & von Cramon, 
2002; Rogers et al., 1998) while the process of task-set inhibition involves the right 
prefrontal cortex (Aron, Monsell et al., 2004). 
1.1. Practice effects in task switching 
This experimental paradigm of Jersild (1927) had confounds several factors. For instance, in 
addition to having switch tasks in an alternating run block, the participants were also 
required to perform two tasks while in a pure run, only one task was performed. Rogers and 
Monsell (1995) introduced an “alternating run” paradigm (AABBAABB...) to avoid such 
confounds, with switch costs now being measured within blocks (reaction times on 
alternating/switch trials minus reaction times on non-alternating/repeat trials) as the subjects 
were required to alternate between runs of two/more trials of each task – so avoiding overall 
differences in the number of tasks being performed. This study is of particular interest to the 
present thesis because it highlighted the effects of practice on task switching performance. 
Rogers and Monsell presented classification tasks in which a letter had to be categorized as a 
consonant or a vowel and the other task required odd or even classification of a digit 
stimulus. Switching costs between repeat and switch trials were compared, over 2 days of 
practice. The results showed an average task switching cost of 224 ms which fell from 262 
ms on the first day to 186 ms on the second day. The notion that switch costs can be reduced 
as a function of practice was further strengthened by Meuter and Allport (1999). They 
presented single digits ranging from 1 to 9 in the centre of a coloured rectangle to bilinguals 
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and with the instructions that the colour of the rectangle would serve as a cue as to which 
language to name the numeral in (e.g., for an English and French speaker “blue” might 
indicate “name the numeral in English” and “yellow” name the numeral in French). Vocal 
responses were made to 200 items. The results showed that switch trials were slower than 
repeat trials for each language and language-switching costs were regularly greater when 
switching from the weaker second language into the stronger first language (again, switch 
costs here being larger for the easier, first language, mimicking the results with Stroop 
stimuli noted above). To explore the effects of practice, Meuter and Allport selected the first 
15 and last 15 correct trials in each condition over the list of 200 numerals. The analysis 
showed a benefit from practice on repeat trials for both of the languages, with the second 
language showing a larger practice effect than the first (41 vs. 27 ms). Conversely on switch 
trials, RTs in the dominant language showed larger reductions with practice compared to the 
second language (65 vs. 30 ms). 
1.2. Asymmetric switch cost between different tasks 
As already mentioned, asymmetries in switch costs have been found when participants 
switch between different tasks (see also Campbell, 2005; Cherkasova, Manoach, & 
Intriligator, 2002; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005; Schneider & Anderson, 2010).  This has 
been examined most thoroughly using the Stroop task. Stroop colour naming is one of the 
most widely studied paradigms for examining selective attention as it requires a person to 
selectively attend to one component of a multidimensional stimulus while ignoring another 
(Stroop, 1935; for review see MacLeod, 1991). In the classic version, participants are asked 
to name the colour of the ink in which the word is written. Typically, reaction times (RTs) to 
name the ink colour are slower when word‘s name is incongruent (word RED in blue ink) 
relative to when it is congruent (RED in red ink).  
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  Wylie and Allport (2000, experiment 1) presented Stroop stimuli (six words: red, 
green, blue, yellow, pink, and brown, word and colour always incongruent), neutral stimuli 
for colour naming  (string of “x” three to six characters long of the six colours used in Stroop 
stimuli) or word reading (six words in black) in the top two quadrants of a computer screen 
as the task cue for “word reading” and the bottom two quadrants as the task cue for “colour 
naming”. In block 1 all-neutral words were presented, then in block 2 colour –neutral 
stimuli, followed by block 3, with presentation of all-Stroop words.. The results in block 1, 2 
and 3 showed slower performance on switch than repeat trials and word reading faster than 
colour naming. Comparisons of performance across the initial blocks in the word reading 
task (block 1 and 2) showed only a reliable effect of switch- longer latencies on switch than 
repeat trials. Comparisons between block 2 and 3 showed reliable effects of switch- slower 
performance on switch than repeat trials and block- and longer latencies when the task 
involved Stroop stimuli than when it involved neutral stimuli. In the colour naming task, 
participants exhibited longer latencies on colour switch trials in the colour-neutral than in the 
all-neutral block (block 1 vs. block 2) and the comparison between blocks 2 and 3 revealed a 
reliable effect of switching - slower performance on switch than repeat trials and block- with 
longer latencies when the task involved Stroop stimuli than when it involved neutral stimuli.   
These data on task switching suggest that there can be asymmetric costs, depending 
on task difficulty, and that switch costs reduce with practice at the tasks. In chapter 2 of this 
thesis, I evaluate factors that may influence the effects of practice on task switching with 
Stroop stimuli, manipulating (e.g.) whether the same colours are assigned to the same words 
across trials, as participants practice on the task. Repeating a common binding of colour and 
identity across trials may lead to stronger associations of colours and words which might 
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make it more difficult to ignore the irrelevant dimension of the stimulus and it may counter-
act general benefits to performance as tasks are repeated. 
1.3. Asymmetric switch cost between attributes of face 
Most studies of switch costs have either used different stimuli or had participants respond to 
different dimensions of the same stimulus (e.g., word identity and colour). In present studies, 
I will present novel experiments examining task switching when responses are required to 
similar attributes of stimuli on repeat and switch trials – facial emotion, gender and 
occupation/identity. There is evidence that all of these tasks depend on configural 
information (relation among features) that is coded from faces – an ability which appears to 
develop early in life (see Carey and Diamond, 1994). Evidence for configural processing of 
faces comes from studies showing that face processing, perhaps more than the processing of 
other objects, is disrupted when the spatial relations between the features is manipulated (see 
Kaloscai & Biederman, 1997). The importance of configural information in face processing 
is further highlighted by Young et al. (1987) using a facial composite technique in which 
photographs of the top and bottom halves of different famous faces fused to form unfamiliar 
faces when aligned with each other. The perception of a novel configuration in such 
composite faces made identification of the constituent parts harder than when the faces were 
misaligned. Baudouin and Humphreys (2006) reported a decline in performance (slower and 
more error prone) for classifying the gender of composite faces when the top half and the 
bottom half of faces with different genders were aligned relative to when they were non-
aligned or same gender face. In addition, gender discrimination was also disrupted when 
salience of the configural information was reduced (by inversion). Similarly, Calder et al. 
(2000) prepared composite facial expressions by aligning the top half of one expression 
(e.g., anger) with the bottom half of  another expression (e.g., happy), and this made the 
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identification of expression slower relative to when non-composite images were presented 
where two halves were misaligned.  
Neuropsychological studies suggest that the different components of face processing 
are functionally independent, for example, gender classification dissociates from emotion 
discrimination following brain injury (Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993). Patients 
with prosopagnosia, and poor retrieval of occupation and name information, may still 
successfully perform gender categorization, suggesting that the process relies on different 
information to that required for face recognition (see e.g., Clarke et al., 1997; Tranel, 
Damasio & Damasio, 1988; Sergent & Villemure, 1989; Flude, Ellis, & Kay, 1989). In 
addition, face identification and emotion discrimination can also dissociate (e.g., Campbell, 
Landis, & Regan, 1986; Parry, Young, Saul, & Moss, 1991). Given the differing patterns of 
dissociation, I predict that substantial effects of task switching may occur, when participants 
have to shift from one classification task to another (e.g., gender to emotion or identity). 
Also it has been noted (e.g., Wang et al., 2007; Schneider & Anderson, 2010; Koch, Prinz, & 
Allport, 2005) that there can be asymmetrical effects of task switching where there is a 
greater switching cost on the easier of two tasks (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Meuter & Allport, 
1999). These asymmetrical effects may reflect the inhibition of the easier of two tasks to 
enable the more difficult to be performed, at least when both tasks may be cued by the same 
stimulus. In the present thesis facial stimuli were used and it is possible that one form of 
classification may need to be inhibited if it is applied more easily than the other. I will report 
data on gender, emotion and occupation decisions. Emotions may be categorized 
automatically, even when participants can not consciously report on the presence of the face 
(Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001). In contrast to this, gender information is not automatically 
categorized at least with famous faces (Quinn, Mason, & Macrae, 2009); however equivalent 
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data on the retrieval of occupation information from faces has not been derived making it 
difficult to predict performance in this case. Nevertheless, we may predict that emotion 
classification may have to be inhibited to enable the other classifications to occur, generating 
asymmetric switch costs.  
Alongside this, there are cultural variations in the allocation of attention to configural 
information in visual stimuli. For example, some data suggest that East Asians rely more on 
configural than feature based processing compared to Americans for stimuli including 
natural scenes (e.g., Masuda et al., 2008; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001, 2006) and geometric 
figures (e.g., Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). In addition, East Asians are 
more affected by contextual surround cues than Western participants. For example when 
participants were presented with a square frame with a printed line within it, followed by the 
presentation of another square frame of the same/different size and were asked to draw a 
line- identical to the first line either in absolute length or in to proportion to the height of the 
surrounding frame, Japanese participants were more accurate in the relative task while 
Americans performed more accurate on the absolute task (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & 
Larsen, 2003).  In addition, when viewing naturalistic scenes containing a focal object on a 
complex background, Eastern participants (Chinese) report more details in the background 
compared with Western observers. This suggests Eastern participants process scenes in a 
more holistic manner (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005). East Asians found to be more 
sensitive towards changes to the contextual background while Americans detected more 
changes in the focally presented object (Nisbett & Masuda, 2003). These cultural variations 
extend to face perception. For instance, when asked to choose a prototypic face for a set of 
exemplars, Japanese choose faces that are more 'configural' (where configurations are 
created by blending the facial features of four faces defined by ethnicity and gender) 
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compared to Americans - suggesting that Japanese participants place more reliance on 
overall resemblance than featural matching. In a speeded identity matching task, when the 
configural changes were manipulated by altering the spaces between individual features, 
Japanese participants have been shown to identify spacing differences between facial 
features more accurately than Americans (Miyamoto, Yoshikawa, & Kitayama, 2011). Blais 
et al. (2008) monitored eye movements of Western and Asian observers when they 
categorized own and other race faces. The results demonstrated a differential strategy 
between Asian and Western participants. East Asians focused more on the central face 
region which is instrumental in the integration of information holistically while Western 
Caucasian observers focused more across facial features in more peripheral regions. 
Although both emotion and gender discrimination appear to depend on facial 
configurations, they have also been found to generate asymmetric effects under task 
switching conditions. For example, Reimers and Maylor (2005) had participants performed 
speeded face categorization tasks to facial emotion and gender, comparing performance 
across trials where the tasks repeated and when they switched. Within a switching block 
(NSw RT minus Sw RT), switch costs for the emotion task were larger than for the gender 
task. In the present thesis I conduct a similar comparison, but also including a further task 
(occupation decisions) which requires access to facial identity. I assess whether there are 
baseline differences between these tasks, and whether there are asymmetric switching costs. 
To the extent that the two tasks require access to the same information, then strong switch 
costs may not be expected. On the other hand, some tasks may be more attentionally 
engaging than others – for example, emotion judgments more than gender, which may be 
based on relatively superficial characteristics of faces. If this is the case then asymmetric 
switch costs may emerge since attention may be engaged more easily to facial emotion than 
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to (say) facial gender. In addition, I examine any cultural effects when Asian and Western 
participants switched between emotion and gender categorization responses to faces (chapter 
4). To the extent that Western and Asian participants may put differential ‘weight’ on 
emotion and gender judgments, and to the extent that there are differences in configural 
processing in relation to the judgments, then a differential ease of switching to and from 
facial attributes may arise between the Western and Asian participants. 
1.4. Individual differences in Task switching 
Previous work (Salthouse et al., 1998) revealed that there are individual differences in the 
ability to switch between different tasks, particularly, the ease to switch to and from a task, 
with the efficiency of performing a specific task being modulated by intelligence. In 
particular, faster switchers had higher fluid intelligence. In addition to this, factor analysis 
revealed that measures of task switching were highly correlated (i.e., -.85 and -.88) with 
tasks related to IQ (cube assembly, geometric matrices adapted from Ravens progressive 
matrices, Rey auditory verbal learning). Similarly mixing costs under dual task conditions 
have an inverse correlation with IQ (Yehene & Meiran, 2007). In chapter 3, my aim is to 
investigate whether intelligence can predict task switching performance. I also investigate 
effects of emotional intelligence (EI). Self-report measures of emotional intelligence (EI) do 
not correlate with general intelligence (IQ) (Barchard and Hakstian, 2004), with EI being 
specifically related to skills in emotion perception (people high in EI are better at perceiving 
emotional expressions from faces than individuals low in EI; Ciarrochi, Chan, & Bajgar, 
2001). Given that high EI individuals show beneficial processing of emotion, then there is 
the possibility that high EI individuals may be better able to switch to emotion decisions to 
faces than individuals low in EI. This issue is further taken up in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Various definitions of EI exist in the literature; According to the trait model by Goleman 
(1998), EI reflects the operation of four broad areas: self-awareness, motivation, empathy 
and adeptness in relationships. Salovey and Mayer (1990), in contrast, define EI as the 
ability to perceive and express emotion, the ability to regulate emotion, and the ability to 
utilize emotions when solving problems. BarOn (1997) proposes that EI is an umbrella term 
reflecting multiple non-cognitive capabilities, competencies, and skills required in coping 
with environmental demands and pressures. In a comprehensive analysis of different EI 
measures, Barchard and Hakstian (2004) reported that self-report measures of EI do not 
correlate with general intelligence (IQ), but rather provide measures of the self-perception of 
emotional sensitivity. Ability-based measures of EI have two factors: emotional congruence 
and social perceptiveness. Emotional congruence refers to the perceived affective quality of 
the stimulus and is relatively independent of traditional cognitive abilities, while social 
perceptiveness refers to the understanding of interpersonal relations and the relationship 
between emotion and behaviour in various situations, and has moderate correlation with 
verbal ability and inductive reasoning.  
The five composite factors capturing EI are: (1) Intrapersonal EQ, which assesses 
the inner self. High scores on this factor indicate individuals who feel positive about 
themselves and feel good what they are doing in their lives. (2) Interpersonal EQ which 
reflects empathy, interpersonal relationships, and social responsibility. High score on this 
factor indicate responsible and dependable individuals who understand and interact well with 
others. (3) Adaptability EQ, which measures the ability to cope with environmental demands 
and to solve problems effectively. (4) Stress management EQ, which indicates the skill to 
withstand stress without losing control. (5) General mood EQ, which consists of happiness 
and optimism factors. High scores on this factor indicate cheerful, positive and optimistic 
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individuals who know how to enjoy life (BarOn, 1997). EI and IQ have both been shown to 
affect cognitive performance, for example, people with higher EI have been shown to solve 
more problems on anagrams (scrambled words) than individuals with lower EI, at least in 
part because they persist in their performance even when encountering frustrating and 
difficult sets of problems (Schutte, Schuettpelz, & Malouff, 2001). There is also a positive 
correlation (r=.36) between EI and grades of high school students (Marquez, Martin, & 
Brackett, 2006). However, in some studies, when IQ has been partialled out, the correlation 
between EI and IQ drops to non-significance (Lam & Kirby, 2002). Though EI and IQ are 
not synonymous, EI is more closely related to crystallize compared to fluid abilities (see e.g., 
Farrelly & Austin, 2007; MacCann et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2005). Fluid intelligence 
refers to skills associated with logical thinking and problem solving whereas crystallized 
intelligence reflects the ability to use knowledge and experience (Cattell, 1971). In chapter 3, 
I assessed whether different aspects of EI could predict switching performance between 
contrasting face classification tasks. 
In the final empirical chapter in the thesis (chapter 5), I examine task switching 
between different face judgment tasks again, but this time using the within-block switching 
procedure of Rogers and Monsell (1995), where tasks are switched across alternating pairs 
of trials. This procedure enables manipulations to be made where an irrelevant feature of the 
stimulus is allowed to vary or stay constant as tasks repeat or switch, so that effects of an 
irrelevant change on the main repeat and switch task can be measured. This then provides a 
novel measure of implicit processing of different face dimensions. I compare effects of 
changing emotion, gender and occupation, to evaluate if some but not all aspects of faces are 
processed implicitly.  
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In this thesis, I report four empirical chapters examining task switching in relation to 
the effects of practice and the regular or more varied pairing of stimulus properties (chapter 
2), individual differences in responses to faces for gender, emotion, and occupation decisions 
(chapter 3), responses to these properties as a function of the race of the participant (chapter 
4), and the effects of implicit changes in faces on different explicit face judgments (chapter 
5). In addition, I examine task switching using both blocked trials (chapters 2-4) and a within 
block switching procedure (chapter 5), which can respectively assess the decrease in 
switching effects across trials under blocked conditions (see Allport & Wylie, 1999) and 
switching when dual task loads are equated (in the within-block procedure). The results have 
implications for understanding: (i) how practice, along with the learning of attribute-specific 
bindings, influences task switching (ii) how switching operates between different facial 
attributes (iii) how aspects of face processing and task switching differ across individuals 
varying in IQ, EI and races/culture and (iv) the implicit processing of different facial 
attributes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRACTICE, SWITCHING AND COLOUR-WORD INTEGRATION IN STROOP 
INTERFERENCE 
Abstract 
Colour and word identification were examined to colour-word names in different 
hues using a manual response task in which participants switched tasks across different trial 
blocks. In addition, either hue-word relations were kept constant on incongruent trials across 
trial blocks, or they varied randomly across different pairings within the stimulus set. 
Symmetric patterns of switch-cost interference were found for word and colour 
identification. In addition, while switch costs generally decreased with practice, Stroop 
interference increased in the condition in which the incongruent hue-word relations were 
maintained. The data suggest that switch-costs reduce as more resources become released 
due to practice. However, Stroop effects can increase when words and hues become bound 
by learning, which can make it more difficult to ignore the word when responding to the hue. 
The implications for understanding switch costs and Stroop interference are discussed. 
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Stroop colour naming is one of the most widely studied paradigms for examining human 
selective attention as it demonstrates that striking problems that can arise when we have to 
selectively attend to one component of a multidimensional stimulus and ignore a highly 
overlearned response to another (Stroop, 1935; for a review see MacLeod, 1991). In the 
classic version of the test, participants are asked to name the colour of the ink in which the 
word is written while ignoring the word. Typically, reaction times (RTs) to name the ink 
colour are slower when word‘s name is incongruent (word RED in blue ink) relative to when 
it is congruent with the colour name (RED in red ink). In contrast, at least for naming tasks, 
the effects of colour congruence on word naming are small (White, 1969). However, this 
result changes when participants make manual responses, when congruency effects are more 
equitable for colour and word naming (McClain, 1983 a,b). The data on Stroop interference 
are typically attributed to an alternative response competing with the required response when 
the stimuli are incongruent relative to when they are congruent (Sichel & Chandler, 1969; 
Regan, 1979; Dunbar & MacLeod, 1984). For naming, word reading is the dominant 
response and so there is more competition from the word’s name for colour naming than 
from the colour’s name for word reading. However, as there is not a dominant manual 
response to words or colours, this asymmetric interference effect disappears. 
2.1. Learning and switching 
The differential effects of interference on colour and word naming suggest that Stroop 
effects can be modulated by the amount of practice people have on tasks. There is evidence 
that practice on the Stroop task itself changes the magnitude of interference effects. With 
practice, people gain in attentional control as shown in a classic Stroop experiment (1935), 
when subjects were presented conflicting word stimuli (incongruent words- RED written in 
green ink) to colour name the words. After eight days of practice (200 reactions per day), 
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interference was reduced for conflicting words. Ellis et al. (1989) instructed their subjects to 
practice the Stroop colour-naming task over three or four daily sessions. The results showed 
a significant decrease in interference over practice trials. Similarly, Ellis and Dulaney (1991) 
instructed normal adults to read Stroop words, followed by practice in colour naming with 
Stroop words, then reading Stroop words. The results demonstrated reduced Stroop 
interference after practice. MacLeod (1998) also had participants practice on both word and 
colour naming with Stroop stimuli across 5 consecutive days and reported that interference 
on colour naming decreased by 49%.  
In addition to the effects of practice, there is also considerable evidence that 
switching between colour and word naming can impact on Stroop interference. This 
switching ability may improve as it gets repeated more often. Wylie and Allport (2000, 
Experiment 1), presented Stroop stimuli (incongruent words) and neutral stimuli (a string of 
“xs” 3-6 characters long) for colour naming and word reading. Though they found that word 
reading was faster than colour naming. RTs were slowed on the initial trials in a block after a 
task switch occurred, relative to when the task was maintained. 
Interestingly, there were asymmetrical effects of task switching between colour and 
word naming where word naming (the usually easier task) was differentially slowed on 
switch trials. Furthermore, on switch trials, there was large ‘reverse’ Stroop interference 
where an incongruent colour now disrupted word naming. Allport, Styles, and Hsieh (1994) 
argued that, in addition, to any differential effects of long-term learning on word and colour 
responding, there can be more transient effects reflecting (for example) the temporary 
inhibition of an over-learned task (word naming) to enable switching to occur to the less 
well-learned task. Alongside this, long-term learning could reduce general costs from any 
effortful inhibition processes by increasing stimulus-response mappings for colour relative to 
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word responses. The inter-play between long-term learning and more temporary factors 
influencing Stroop interference across trials and trial blocks have not been examined; 
however, there have been studies of long-term effects of learning on task switching. More 
generally, it has been consistently shown that switching costs decrease across trials as 
subjects practice. For example, Cepeda, Kramer, and Gonzalez (2001) reported decreased 
switch costs after practice in digit identification-digit counting task. Sohn and Anderson 
(2001) found reduced switch costs as a result of practice when participants switched between 
letters and digits. Similarly, Strobach, Liepelt, and Schubert (2011) found reduced switch 
costs as a result of practice from session 2 to 8, as participants responded to visual and 
auditory stimuli.  
Here I assessed effects of long-term learning on task-switching effects on Stroop 
interference. Participants underwent four blocks of trials, and within each block, participants 
received a sub-block of trials where they responded to colour and another where they 
responded to word identity. I compared performance on the initial trials in a sub-block (trials 
1-4) after a switch, with the later (non-switch) trials (5-16). In contrast to prior studies 
examining task switching in a Stroop task, participants made manual rather than verbal 
responses. Manual responses typically do not yield asymmetrical interference effects 
(Flowers & Stoup, 1977). I assessed whether in the absence of any asymmetrical interference 
effects, any differential effects of task switching emerged on colour and word response trials. 
In addition, I evaluated whether there were changes in Stroop interference as participants 
became more practiced on the task. With practice, I might expect Stroop interference in 
general, and effects of task switching in particular to decrease. However, I also manipulated 
the relations between the specific colours and words being used.  Experiments 1 and 2 used a 
small set of items where, on incongruent trials, a specific word was always and uniquely 
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paired with a specific colour. In this case across trials, specific colours and words should 
become strongly linked. In experiment 2, the incongruent trials were formed by random re-
pairings of all the colours and the words so that a given colour could be paired with several 
words. In this case, it may be more difficult to establish specific linkages between a given 
colour and a given word. I evaluated whether this would then modulate the effects of 
practice on both Stroop interference and task switching. 
2.2. Colour and word integration 
Prior studies have shown that Stroop interference is greater when colours are integrated with 
colour words compared with when the stimuli are presented in a non-integrated fashion. 
Besner and Stolz (1999) for example, presented stimuli where, instead of the whole word, 
only one of the letters was coloured. Stroop interference decreased in the single-letter-cued 
condition compared to al1 letters-cued condition. Risko, Stolz, and Besner (2005, 
Experiment 1) similarly presented displays of either colour words (i.e., green, red, blue, and 
yellow) or colour-neutral words (e.g., house) in 16 different locations for visual search. In 
the integrated condition, the target colour and the coloured word were spatially integrated 
together while in the separated condition, the target colour and the coloured word were 
spatially separated. Participants were instructed to classify the colour of the target item 
among the four different display colours. When the target colour and the colour word were 
integrated, the participants responded more quickly on congruent than incongruent trials. 
When the target colour and the coloured word were separated, responses on congruent and 
incongruent trials were equivalent. 
In the present study, the consistent pairing of one colour and one word on colour 
blocked incongruent trials in experiments 1 and 2 may lead, across the sub-blocks in the 
experiment, to the word and the colour forming an integrated representation. Based on prior 
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experiments on the effects of perceptual integration on Stroop interference, I predict that 
congruity effects will increase as representations become more integrated. The congruity 
effects will then increase with practice in the experiment. In contrast, when consistent 
pairings are not used (in experiment 2), only beneficial effects of practice may emerge, since 
integrated colour/word representations are not being formed. In this instance, congruity 
effect should decrease with (general) practice. 
2.3. Experiment 1 
2.3.1. Method 
 Participants 
A total of 18 undergraduate and postgraduate students who responded to the 
advertisement at University of Birmingham (11 females and 7 male, ages 20-27 years, mean 
23.68 years) with self-reported normal colour vision were recruited for the study and paid 
£6/hr. As a precondition, none smoked cigarettes or drank caffeine beverages within 3 hr 
before testing session. None had participated in a similar experiment. No participant reported 
any injury, disease or eye surgery. Of the participants, 4 had eyesight corrected to normal 
with contact lenses, and the remaining reported normal vision. Two participants were 
rejected because of excessive eye closure during the experiment. The final sample included 
16 students.  
Stimuli and displays 
Word/Colour Identification task stimuli and block structure. The stimuli consisted of eight 
coloured words. The stimuli were depicted in the colour corresponding to the coloured word 
for four words: ‘Blue’, ‘Green’, ‘Red’, and ‘Yellow’ (congruent) and one specific mismatch 
for each word in incongruent trials (e.g., the word ‘Red’ was always presented in blue). All 
the stimuli were same for the two tasks except they were either presented against a pink or 
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aqua colour background to signal either word or colour identification (counter-balanced 
across participants). The RGB breakdowns for the stimuli were: blue= 0,0,255, green= 
128,255,128, red= 255,0,0, and yellow= 255,255,128. The experiment was designed in E-
prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002, version 1.2). The participants 
responded by pressing different keys set on a keyboard. Each trial began with the 
presentation of a central fixation (+) cross in 18 point, Courier New font, black = {(0,0,0)} 
against gray background for 1,000 ms, followed by a blank screen (grey, with an RGB 
breakdown of 192, 192,192) for 1,000 ms, then the word until the response. The words were 
written in courier new font, 38 point, bold, with height and width 100% (fig.2.1). Subjects 
were presented with eight alternating blocks of the word and colour identification tasks with 
16 trials in each block. For half of the participants, the experiment started with the 
presentation of the word identification task. This was counterbalanced across participants, 
for the other half of the participants, the colour identification task was carried out at first. 
Apparatus  
All the stimuli were presented in the center of a 14 inch laptop screen.  
Design and procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a single session and was performed in a dark room. 
Participants were given an informed consent form and a description of the experiment. They 
were told that this was a reaction time experiment, and that they must respond by pressing 
the fixed keys on the keyboard as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy. The 
participants were instructed to “identify the word” in the word identification task and 
“identify the colour in which the word is printed” in the colour identification task. They were 
told that the response keys were: 1=blue, 2=green, 3=red, 4=yellow and any questions were 
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answered. The participants completed 128 experimental trials of the word/colour 
identification task. Following this, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.1. Word / Colour Identification tasks with the congruent and incongruent word stimuli in alternate run. 
2.3.2. Results 
The data from first two blocks were discarded because no task switch took place for block 1, 
then outliers were removed and response times (RTs) were excluded above 2.5 standard 
deviations from each participants’ mean. Responses longer than 3,000 ms or shorter than 100 
ms were also omitted. Mean RTs on trials 1-4 were taken as reflecting performance 
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following a switch and responses on trials 5-16 were taken as task-repeat trials1. The data are 
reported in two sections. First, the effect of task switching was assessed with the data 
averaged across congruent and incongruent trials since there were insufficient trials per sub-
block (switch vs. repeat trials) to treat congruent and incongruent trials separately. Second, 
the effects of congruency were examined with the data averaged only across repeat trials. 
Note that this second analysis examines the basic Stroop effect during a stable period of task 
performance (when the task was repeated across trials). 
Switching effect 
 Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task 
switch (switch vs. repeat) x block (second vs. third vs. fourth) x task (word identification vs. 
colour identification) as within subject factors. The main effect of task switch was 
significant F (1, 13) =54.54, p<0.001, MSE=82384.99, ηp2=.80. RTs were slower on switch 
(M=1453.31 ms) than repeat (M=1126.20 ms) trials. The effects of block (F<2) and task 
failed to reach significance (F<1). None of the interactions were significant (F<2) (fig. 2.2).  
The error rate was low and there was no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off. The results 
are presented in table 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This was done in order to accumulate stable numbers of switch trials and was supported by inspection of the 
pattern of RTs across the trials within a block, which asymptoted after 4 trials. In addition, congruency effects 
were only evaluated across repeat trials because only these trials provided sufficient data. 
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Table 2.1 
 Mean percentage errors (PE) and standard deviations (SD) of errors on switch and repeat 
trials in experiment 1 and 2 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 1 
   
 Experiment 2 
 
Constant 
Colour-Word 
   
 
 
Alternating 
Colour-Word 
 
  
Switch 
 
Repeat 
  
Switch 
 
Repeat 
  
Switch 
 
Repeat 
Task PE (SD) PE (SD)  PE (SD) PE (SD)  PE (SD) PE (SD) 
 
Word 
Identification 
        
         
Block 2 3 (.02) 4 (.02)  3 (.02) 4 (.07)  1 (.01) 2 (.04) 
Block 3 2 (.03) 4.5 (.02)  2 (.02) 3 (.07)  2 (.02) 1 (.02) 
Block 4 1 (.01) 4.5 (.03)  3.5 (.03) 3.5 (.06)  5 (.02) 2 (.04) 
 
Colour 
Identification 
        
         
Block 2 2 (.02) 3 (.03)  2 (.01) 2 (.04)  3 (.02) 1.5 (.03) 
Block 3 2 (.03) 2 (.01)  3 (.02) 1 (.02)  1 (.01) 2.5 (.04) 
Block 4 1 (.01) 2 (.02)  3.5 (.04) 2 (.04)  3 (.04) 3.5 (.04) 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
Fig.2.2a.  Mean reaction times (ms) in the word identification task. 
 
Fig.2.2b. Mean reaction times (ms) in the colour identification task. 
Congruency effect 
The mean RTs on repeat trials (5-16) were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with task (word identification vs. colour identification), block (second 
vs. third vs. fourth) and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as within subject factors. 
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The main effect of congruency was significant F (1, 13) =51.16, p<0.001, MSE=57521.18, 
ηp2=.79 such that RTs were faster on congruent (M= 984.32 ms) than incongruent 
(M=1249.04 ms) stimuli. The effects of block (F <3) and task (F <1) failed to reach 
significance. There was one significant higher order interaction which was between task, 
block, and congruency F (2, 26) =7.05, p<0.01, MSE=22026.72, ηp2=.35 (fig.2.3). This was 
decomposed by analysing the data separated for congruent and the incongruent trials, for the 
word and colour identification tasks. For the word identification task, there was no effects 
of block (F<1). There was main effect of congruency F (1, 13)= 45.64, p<.001, 
MSE=29954.27, ηp2=.77. The interaction between block and congruency was failed to reach 
a significant level F<3. For the colour identification task, there was no effect of block F <3. 
There was a main effect of congruency F (1, 13)= 38.73, p<.001, MSE=40789.12, ηp2=.74, 
and there was a significant interaction between block and congruency F (2, 26) = 5.40, 
p<.01, MSE=26260.19, ηp2=.29. The magnitude of the congruency effect (incongruent 
minus congruent trials) increased with practice F (2, 26)= 5.40, p<.01, MSE=52520.73, 
ηp2=.29.  
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Fig.2.3a. Mean reaction times on congruent and incongruent words in the word identification task. Error bars 
represent average standard error. 
 
Fig.2.3b. Mean reaction times on congruent and incongruent words in the colour identification task. Error bars 
represent average standard error. 
The error rate was low and there was no speed-accuracy trade-off (see table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2 
Mean percentage errors (PE) and standard deviations of errors (SD) for congruent and 
incongruent words in experiment 1 and 2 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 1 
   
 Experiment 2 
 
Constant 
Colour-Word 
   
 
 
Alternating 
Colour-Word 
 
  
Congruent 
 
Incongruent 
  
Congruent 
 
Incongruent 
  
Congruent 
 
Incongruent 
Task PE (SD) PE (SD)  PE (SD) PE (SD)  PE (SD) PE (SD) 
 
Word 
Identification 
        
         
Block 2 3 (.03) 5 (.02)  3 (.06) 5 (.08)  1 (.03) 3 (.06) 
Block 3 4 (.02) 5 (.02)  2 (.04) 4 (.10)  1 (.03) 1 (.02) 
Block 4 5 (.05) 4 (.03)  2 (.04) 5 (.09)  1 (.03) 3 (.06) 
 
Colour 
Identification 
        
         
Block 2 3 (.04) 3 (.02)  1 (.03) 5 (.06)  2 (.04) 1 (.02) 
Block 3 3 (.02) 1 (.01)  1 (.01) 2 (.04)  1 (.02) 4 (.06) 
Block 4 3 (.03) 1 (.02)  1 (.02) 5 (.08)  2 (.04) 5 (.04) 
 
2.3.3. Discussion 
Switching effect 
Performance on switch trials was slower than on repeat trials but there was no asymmetry 
with the task (no larger effect for word than colour identification). This stands in contrast 
with previous reports (Wylie and Allport, 2000; Allport, Styles, and Hsieh, 1994) where 
larger switch costs have been reported for word reading tasks. This difference can be 
attributed to the response mode which varied across the studies. Here manual responses were 
made while vocal responses were made in the previous studies. Manual responses are known 
to reduce asymmetry effects in Stroop interference (e.g., Keele, 1972; Pritchatt, 1968). I 
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show that the lack of asymmetry also extends to task switching. There was also no change in 
the switching effect across blocks.  
Congruency effect 
Overall, there was an equal congruency effect for both the word and colour identification 
tasks. This fits with prior studies using manual responses (e.g., Keele, 1972; Pritchatt, 1968). 
Congruency interacted with block and task. For colour identification only, there was a 
differential effect of congruency across the blocks as RTs on congruent trials decreased 
while on incongruent trials RTs tended to increase. If this is a general practice effect, why 
did RTs on incongruent trials not decrease too? An alternative account can be proposed 
based on the idea of colour and word binding. Risko, Stolz, and Besner (2005), for example, 
reported faster RTs on congruent trials and slower RTs on incongruent trials relative to 
neutral trials when the colour word and the colour target were integral. With a small set of 
colours and words, and with certain words always paired with the same colour here, then 
integrated word-colour representations may be formed. Due to these integrated 
representations, then it may prove more difficult to select the relevant and ignore the 
irrelevant representations as practice proceeds. Hence the congruency effects increased with 
practice. This still leaves open questions such as why the practice effect was evident on 
colour rather than word identification, and why RTs were speeded on congruent trials rather 
than being slowed to the same degree on incongruent trials. These points are taken up in the 
general discussion. 
This idea of learned colour-word bindings was further tested in experiment 2. In this 
study, I directly contrasted performance when the bindings were kept constant (on 
incongruent trials one word was assigned to one colour) with performance when the bindings 
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varied (where participants received all colour-word pairings, so one word was not 
consistently paired with one color). Did congruency effects change with practice, for the 
constant colour-word condition only?  
2.4. Experiment 2 
2.4.1. Method 
 Participants 
24 undergraduate and postgraduate students were used, each having responded to an 
advertisement at University of Birmingham (9 females and 15 male, ages 21-25 years, mean 
22.62 years). All had self-reported normal colour vision. As a precondition, none smoked 
cigarettes or drank caffeine beverages within 3 hour before testing session. None had 
participated in a similar experiment. None had reported any injury, disease or eye surgery. 
The experiments were designed in E-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 
2002, version 1.2). Participants were divided in three groups (8 participants per group) and 
they performed constant colour-word and alternating colour-word conditions with an interval 
of 1 week between, and the order of these two conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Stimuli and displays 
The stimuli and displays were same as in experiment 1, but with varied block presentation, 
described as follows. 
Block Presentation for Constant Colour-Word  
Each group of participants was administered the same congruent words along with a varied 
presentation of incongruent words, which remained constant in all four blocks of the 
30 
 
experiment. Participants saw the colour words RED, YELLOW, BLUE and GREEN in the 
congruent colours. For one subgroup of participants, incongruent trials were formed by 
writing the word RED in blue, YELLOW in green, BLUE in yellow and GREEN in red 
colour. For second subgroup of participants, incongruent trials were formed by the words 
written as RED in yellow, YELLOW in red, BLUE in green, and GREEN in blue colour. For 
another subgroup, incongruent words were presented as RED in green, YELLOW in blue, 
BLUE in red, and GREEN in yellow colour. 
Blocked Presentation with Alternating Colour-Word Pairings. 
The words were same as in the constant colour-word condition, but incongruent words 
alternated across progressive blocks (i.e., there was one colour-word assignment for 
incongruent words on block 1 and 2, another for block 3 and a third for block 4). For 
subgroup 1, the words RED, BLUE, YELLOW and GREEN were assigned the colours blue, 
yellow, green, and red on block 1 and 2; the colours on block 3 were yellow, green, red, and 
blue, and the colours in block 4 were green, red, blue, and yellow.  
For subgroup 2, the words RED, BLUE, YELLOW and GREEN were assigned the colours 
yellow, green, red and blue on block 1 and 2;  green, red, blue, and yellow on block 3 and 
blue, yellow, green, and red on block 4.  
For subgroup 3, the words RED, BLUE, YELLOW and GREEN were assigned the colours 
green, yellow, green, and red on block 1 and 2; yellow, green, red, and blue on block 3, and 
red, blue, yellow, and green on block 4. 
Apparatus and Procedure  
Apparatus and procedure was same as in experiment 1.  
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2.4.2. Results 
As for experiment 1, the data are reported in two sections. First, effect of task switching was 
assessed with the data averaged across congruent and incongruent trials since there were 
insufficient trials per sub-block (switch vs. repeat trials) to treat congruent and incongruent 
trials separately. Second, the effects of congruency were examined, with the data averaged 
across repeat trials since there was not sufficient data on switch trials to enable the contrast 
between congruent and incongruent trials to be assessed. As before, this second analysis 
examined the basic Stroop effect during a stable period of task performance (when the task 
was repeated across trials). The data from first two blocks were discarded because no task 
switch took place for block 1. After this, outliers were removed and response times (RTs) 
were excluded above 2.5 standard deviations from each participants’ mean. Responses 
longer than 3,000 ms or shorter than 100 ms were omitted. Mean RTs on trials 1-4 were 
taken as switch and 5-16 as repeat. 
Switching effects  
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
colour-word (constant vs. alternating), task switch (switch vs. repeat), task (word reading 
vs. colour naming) and block (second vs. third vs. fourth) as within subject factors.  
The RT analysis revealed a reliable main effect of colour-word F (1, 23) =4.82, MSE= 
170103.27, p<0.05, ηp2=.17, such that RTs were slower in the constant colour-word 
(M=1117.17 ms) condition than the alternating colour-word condition (M= 1041.65 ms). The 
effect of task switch was highly significant F (1, 23) =199.69, MSE= 28827.61, p<0.001, 
ηp2=.89. RTs were slower on switch (M=1179.38 ms) than repeat trials (M=979.44 ms). The 
effect of task was significant F (1, 23) =10.57, MSE= 39131.12, p<0.01, ηp2=.31. Colour 
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identification was faster (M=1052.61 ms) than word identification (M=1106.22 ms). There 
was also a significant effect of block F (2, 46) = 13.87, MSE= 60044.19, p<0.001, ηp2=.37. 
RTs decreased from block 2 to 4 (1152.98 vs. 1059.39 vs. 1025.87 ms, respectively).  
There were two significant higher order interactions between colour-word, task switch, and 
task F (1, 23) = 8.57, MSE= 6294.07, p<0.01, ηp2=.27 and task switch, task, and block F (2, 
46) = 14.03, MSE= 14655.43, p<0.001, ηp2=.37.    
Colour-Word, Task Switch, and Task 
The interaction between colour-word, task switch, and task was decomposed by submitting 
the switch costs (switch minus repeat trials) in the word and colour identification tasks for 
constant and alternating colour-word conditions to separate repeated measure ANOVAs.  
For the constant colour-word condition, there was a reliable effect of task on task switch F 
(1, 23) = 11.85, MSE= 11765.73, p<0.01, ηp2=.34. For the alternating colour-word 
condition, there was no effect of task on task switch F<1. 
Pair wise comparisons were made of the switch costs (switch minus repeat trials) 
separately for the constant and alternating colour-word conditions for the word and colour 
identification tasks respectively. The switch cost was larger for colour (M=250.10 ms) than 
word identification (M=142.28 ms; t (23) =3.44, p<.01) when the colour and the word 
relations were constant, but not when they alternated t<1. The contrast between the constant 
and alternating colour-word conditions itself was only reliable for word identification t (23) 
=2.60, p<.01. The effect on word identification was due to reduced switch costs when the 
colour-word relations were constant (fig. 2.4). 
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Fig.2.4a. Mean reaction times on switch and repeat trials in the word identification task in colour-word 
constant condition. Error bars represent average standard error. 
 
Fig. 2.4b. Mean reaction times on switch and repeat trials in colour identification task in colour-word constant 
condition. Error bars represent average standard error. 
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Fig. 2.4c. Mean reaction times on switch and repeat trials on the word identification task in alternating colour-
word condition. Error bars represent average standard error. 
 
Fig.2.4d. Mean reaction times on switch and repeat trials on the colour identification task in alternating colour-
word condition. Error bars represent average standard error. 
Task Switch, Task, and Block 
The interaction between task switch, task, and block was decomposed by submitting the 
switch costs (switch minus repeat trials) for word and colour identification to separate 
repeated measure ANOVAs with block as a within subject factor.  
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The analyses for word and colour identification tasks both showed significant effects 
of  block - on word identification F (2, 46) = 3.34, MSE= 14148.04, p<0.05, ηp2=.12, and on 
colour identification F (2, 46) = 26.09, MSE= 17007.78, p<0.001, ηp2=.53. Pair wise 
comparisons on switch costs in the word identification task between block 2 and 3 failed to 
reach a significant level t <1. For the word identification, there was a drop in switch cost 
from block 3 to block 4 t (23)= 3.41, p< 0.01, For the colour identification, there was a 
drop in switch costs from block 2 to 3 t (23) = 7.21, p< 0.001, but switch costs remained 
larger in block 4 than block 3 t (23)= 2.13, p< 0.5. The error rate was low and there was no 
speed-accuracy trade-off (see table 2.1). 
Congruency effect 
Mean RTs on repeat trials (5-16) were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with task (word identification vs. colour identification), block (second vs. third 
vs. fourth), congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), and colour-word (constant vs. 
alternating) as within subject factors. The main effect of task was significant F (1, 23) 
=18.80, p<0.001, MSE=59514.84, ηp2=.45; colour identification was faster than word 
identification (935.36 vs. 1023. 52 ms, respectively). There was a significant main effect of 
congruency F (1, 23) =94.33, p<0.001, MSE=88103.95, ηp2=.80. RTs on congruent trials 
were faster than on incongruent trials (859 vs. 1099 ms, respectively). There was a 
significant main effect of block F (2, 46) =4.67, p<0.01, MSE=33868.11, ηp2=.16. RTs 
decreased from block 2 to 4 (block 2 = 1008.65 ms vs. block 3 = 978.40 ms vs. block 4= 
951.27 ms). There was also a significant main effect of colour-word F (1, 23) =5.67, p<0.05, 
MSE=130651.61, ηp2=.19. RTs were faster in the constant colour-word (M=943.56) than the 
alternating colour-word condition (M=1015.32). 
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There were three significant higher order interactions between task, congruency, and block F 
(2, 46) =7.37, p<0.01, MSE=21492.74, ηp2=.24; colour-word, task, and congruency F (1, 
23) =5.49, p<0.05, MSE=14173.81, ηp2=.19; and colour-word, block, and congruency F (2, 
46) =3.53, p<0.05, MSE=20767.84, ηp2=.13.  
Task, Congruency x Block 
The interaction between task, congruency, and block was decomposed by submitting RTs on 
congruent and incongruent trials in the word identification and colour identification tasks to 
separate repeated measure ANOVAs with block as within subject factor. For word 
identification, there was no effect of block on either congruent (F <1) or incongruent (F <2) 
trials. For colour identification, there was a significant effect of block on congruent trials F 
(2, 46) =55.53, p<0.01, MSE=1745.63, ηp2=.70. RTs decreased from block 2 to 3 t (23)= 
6.06, p<0.001 and from block 3 to block 4 t (23)= 9.91, p<0.001. The effect of block on 
incongruent words failed to reach significance level (F <1) (fig.2.5). 
  
Fig. 2.5a.  Block wise mean reaction times on congruent and incongruent words in the word identification task. 
Error bars represent average standard error. 
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Fig.2.5b. Block wise mean reaction times on congruent and incongruent words in the colour identification task. 
Error bars represent average standard error. 
Colour-word, Task x Congruency 
The interaction between colour-word, task, and congruency F (1, 23) =5.49, p<0.05, 
MSE=14173.81, ηp2=.19 was decomposed by assessing RTs separated for the constant and 
alternating colour-word conditions. For the constant colour-word condition, there were 
main effects of congruency F (1, 23) =95.92, p<0.01, MSE=14101.70, ηp2=.80, and task F 
(1, 23) =14.37, p<0.01, MSE=22350.97, ηp2=.38. RTs showed an advantage for congruent 
trials and colour identification task. There was no interaction between congruency and task 
F<3. For the alternating colour-word condition, again there were reliable main effects of 
congruency F (1, 23) =42.83, p<0.01, MSE=35752.69, ηp2=.65 and task F (1, 23) =8.61, 
p<0.01, MSE=25248.76, ηp2=.27. Again, RTs showed an advantage for congruent trials and 
for the colour identification task. There was no interaction between congruency and task 
F<1. These analyses indicated that the data patterns were similar for the constant and 
alternating conditions, but the congruency effects on word identification tended to be smaller 
than when the colour-word relations varied (see fig.2.6). 
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Fig.2.6a. Reaction times on congruent and incongruent words in constant colour-word condition. Error bars 
represent average standard error. 
 
 
Fig. 2.6b. Reaction times on congruent and incongruent words in alternating colour-word condition. Error bars 
represent average standard error. 
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alternating colour-word conditions for congruent and incongruent trials. For the constant 
colour-word condition, there were main effects of block F (2, 46) =36.27, p<0.01, 
MSE=14789.76, ηp2=.61 and congruency F (1, 23) =88.35, p<0.01, MSE=3019.57, ηp2=.79 
and a significant interaction between block and congruency F (2, 46) =35.12, p<0.01, 
MSE=9010.76, ηp2=.60. For congruent trials, RTs decreased with blocks F (2, 46) =8.50, 
p<0.01, MSE=4522.71, ηp2=.27, while for incongruent trials, there was no effect of block F 
<1. For the alternating colour-word condition, again there were significant main effects of 
block F (2, 46) =4.64, p<0.01, MSE=20721.44, ηp2=.16, and congruency F (1, 23) =42.83, 
p<0.01, MSE=53629.04, ηp2=.65, but no significant interaction F (2, 46) =0.83, p=0.43, 
MSE=12504.16, ηp2=.03 (see fig.2.7). 
 
Fig.2.7a. Block wise reaction times on congruency for the constant colour-word condition. Error bars represent 
average standard error. 
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Fig.2.7b. Block wise reaction times on the congruency for the alternating colour-word condition. Error bars 
represent average standard error. 
The error rate was less and there was no speed-accuracy trade-off (table 2.2). 
2.4.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate (1) switching effects when the colour-word 
relationship is constant/alternating (2) general practice effects on the word/colour 
identification according to whether the colour-word relationship on the incongruent trials 
was constant or varying. 
Switching effects 
Colour-Word, Task Switch x Task 
Asymmetries in interference across the tasks were observed only when the colour-word 
relationship stayed constant (when there emerged a larger switch cost for the colour than the 
word identification tasks). For the alternating colour-word condition the switch cost was 
equal for both the colour and the word identification tasks.  
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Task Switch, Task x Block 
Switch costs deceased as a function of practice. For the word identification task, the decrease 
in switch costs appeared in the final block (as participants moved from block 3 to block 4). 
In contrast, for the colour identification task, the drop in switch costs emerged earlier in the 
experiment (from block 2). Reductions in switch costs as a result of practice have been well- 
documented (e.g., Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 2001), 
though the tasks used in those studies were different: for example, Strobach et al. (2012) 
observed a reduction in switch costs when participants practiced visual-auditory tasks where, 
in visual task, participants judged the location of the visual stimuli (white circles) while in 
auditory task they judged the intensity of the tone. Kramer, Hahn and Gopher (1999) found 
similar pattern of results in a number-digit value task (in the number task participants were 
presented with rows of digits and had to indicate the number of the digits; in the digit task 
they indicated the value of the digits).  
Here there was evidence for faster emergence of learning effects on the colour task, 
which was also more subject to effects of learning in relation to congruency effects (see 
below). Perhaps the retrieval of the colour name – perhaps still involved despite a manual 
response being required– remains less practiced than word identification, and so amenable to 
stronger effects of learning. 
Congruency effect 
Colour-Word, Block x Congruency 
As in experiment 1, there was an interaction between block and congruency for the colour 
identification task, with congruency effects increasing across the blocks. In this case RTs 
were particularly speeded up only for congruent trials, whilst there was no reliable slowing 
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of incongruent trials. Note that any slowing, on incongruent trials, would have to work 
against general effects of practice on the task. Nevertheless the reliable interaction fits with 
the argument that colour selection becomes more difficult when the word and the colour 
have a consistent relationship, enabling colour-word binding to take place. For the 
alternating colour-word condition, there was a general speeding of responses across 
blocks for congruent and incongruent trials alike, indicating a general practice effect in this 
case. My data on effects of practice with specific colour-word pairings match the data 
previously reported by Risko et al. (2005), where Stroop congruency effects were larger 
when colours were perceptually integrated with words. 
2.5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across two experiments, I have found that the Stroop congruency effect increases across 
trials under conditions when a small constant-set of incongruent colour-words are used. The 
effects emerged through increasing benefits to colour identification on congruent trials, 
while RTs on incongruent trials either tended to increase or they remained constant. I 
suggest that there were two effects of practice on constant, incongruent colour words which 
traded-off against each other to reduce any overall changes on performance: (1) there were 
overall beneficial effects of practice, pitted against (2) increased interference as integrated 
colour-word representations developed. The increased congruency effects were most 
apparent on colour identification trials, consistent with it being more difficult to focus 
attention on colour and to ignore word identity when the colour and the word are strongly 
integrated. On congruent trials, colours and words might be attended as single perceptual 
unit due to the correct relation between colours and words by the visual system. These 
stimulus properties might cooperate towards their faster responding and afford no 
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competition against each other. Practice might modulate the ability to retrieve the stored 
presentations of the relationship between stimulus properties. I suggest with practice, the 
retrieval of perceptual units becomes easier from its’ stored presentations in the visual 
system.   
Critically, these results only arose when particular colours and words were paired 
through an experiment, and they were not apparent when colours and words were re-paired 
across trials. This points to the critical role of learning specific colour-word pairings. Along 
with the effects of congruency I also found that practice reduced switch costs. This replicates 
prior findings (e.g., Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 2001). 
There was no evidence, however, that switch costs were larger on word identification than 
colour identification. This does not match with the previous finding by Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh (1994). However, unlike that study, first, I used a manual response task rather than a 
naming task. Standard asymmetrical Stroop interference effect is typically reduced under 
manual response conditions (e.g., Keele, 1972; Pritchatt, 1968), presumably because manual 
responses to words are not over learned when compared to manual responses to colours. 
Second, the use of inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1000 ms reflected benefits of anticipatory task 
preparation rather than the no manipulation of ITI here. However, the preparation time may 
be manipulated in future studies to examine any preparatory effects in task-set 
reconfiguration. 
The most important result here concerns the learning specific word-colour pairings 
and the related increase in Stroop congruency effects. This fits with prior evidence that 
Stroop interference is stronger for stimuli that form integrated representations, presumably 
because it is then more difficult to attend to the colour dimension relative to the word. 
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Previously word-colour integration has been manipulated by varying the perceptual relations 
between the colour and the whole word (e.g., Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997). Here the 
data suggest that learning a specific word colour relation is also critical. This is consistent 
with prior work showing that learning can modulate the binding between stimulus attributes 
(e.g., Humphreys, Riddoch, & Fortt, 2006). This learning leads to facilitated responses to 
colours on congruent trials. On incongruent trials I suggest that the potentially negative 
consequences of attending to a word strongly integrated with the colour was balanced by the 
benefits of overall practice. This meant that performance on incongruent trials did not vary 
across the blocks (whereas substantial improvements were observed in other conditions, for 
example when the colours and words were not consistently related). It is also of interest that 
the results were strongest on colour identification relative to word identification, despite the 
fact that overall RT differences between the tasks were minimized by the use of manual 
responding. This indicates that there can remain a residual difference in the ease of attending 
to colour and to word identity, while is highlighted when the word and colour are strongly 
integrated. Attention to colour remains vulnerable to the effects of word identity even under 
manual response conditions. 
In addition to the specific effects of learning colour-word pairings, I also found that 
switch costs reduced as participants practiced across trials. This may reflect a number of 
factors including stronger coding of the rule set across the blocks, increased practice at 
stimulus-response mapping and practice at switching from one task to the other. The 
important result, however, is that switching can improve even though selective attention to 
colour can become more difficult through the learning of colour-word bindings. The results 
suggest that the mechanisms of switching are independent of those of colour-form binding 
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CHAPTER 3 
IQ NOT EI CORRELATES WITH TASK SWITCHING 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the ease with which individuals perform various face processing 
tasks, and switch between the tasks, as a function of both their general intelligence (IQ) and 
their emotional intelligence (EI). The results indicate that the ability to switch between all 
combinations of emotion, gender and occupation decision tasks is related to IQ, with smaller 
switching costs found in individuals with higher IQ. Switching costs were also related to EI 
when the task involved emotional decision making, with costs for emotional decision 
making reduced for individuals with high EI. I discuss why high IQ can preserve individuals 
from switch costs and the relations between EI and the processing of emotions. 
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The social identification of the self and others is highly dependent on the social groups to 
which we belong (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Bennett & Sani, 2003; Bigler & Liben, 1993). 
We belong to multiple social groups simultaneously and extract varying degrees of meaning 
from these group identities. A person can be categorized in multiple ways for example 
according to their gender, occupation, ethnicity, etc. (Fiske, 1993). How we might switch 
between these different forms of categorization has rarely been assessed, so we do not know 
whether certain categorizations have a more prolonged impact on subsequent processing 
than others and/or whether it is easier to switch into making one kind of categorization than 
others. This was examined here. I had participants switch between different categorization 
tasks performed on faces. These different forms of categorization are likely to draw-on 
contrasting processes. The multi-stage model of face processing, proposed by Bruce and 
Young (1986), for example, suggests that gender and emotion classifications can be based 
upon structural properties of faces separated from access to stored knowledge of the faces 
(required to classify someone’s occupation). The neuroanatomical model of Haxby, 
Hoffman and Gobbini (2000) suggests that occupation decisions to faces are mediated by a 
ventral face recognition route, while gender and emotion decisions involve more dorsal and 
sub-cortical brain structures. At present, however, we have little understanding about how 
we might switch from one form of classification to another, and what individual difference 
factors might moderate this ability. The present study is aimed at elucidating the ease of 
switching to and from gender and emotion, gender and occupation, and emotion and 
occupation decision tasks. In addition, the ease of switching between the different tasks was 
assessed in relation to individual difference measures reflecting (i) general intelligence (IQ) 
and (ii) emotional intelligence (EI). Given that high EI might reflect the ability to “read” the 
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nonverbal attributes of participants. Participants high in EI might also find it easier to move 
from one aspect of facial categorization to another.  
3.1. Face categorization 
One task required here was gender classification. Gender is a core category that is used to 
classify people with this classification taking place in individuals as early as late toddlerhood 
(e.g., Katz & Kofkin, 1997; Martin & Ruble, 2004). The classification processes are likely to 
draw on face prototypes. Freeman et al. (2008) presented participants with faces judged to be 
prototypical or non-prototypical for their gender, with the task being to categorize the gender 
of each face. Gender classification was faster for the more prototypical faces than for the 
faces that were atypical. In neuropsychological studies, patients with prosopagnosia, and 
poor retrieval of occupation and name information, may still successfully perform gender 
categorization, suggesting that the process relies on different information to that required for 
face recognition (see e.g., Clarke et al., 1997; Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1988; Sergent & 
Villemure, 1989; Flude, Ellis, & Kay, 1989). In addition, gender classification dissociates 
from emotion discrimination following brain injury (Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 
1993). Alongside this, face identification and emotion discrimination can also dissociate 
(e.g., Campbell, Landis, & Regan, 1986; Parry, Young, Saul, & Moss, 1991). These 
differing patterns of dissociation suggest that substantial effects of task switching may occur, 
when participants have to shift from one classification task to another. In other studies (e.g., 
Wang et al., 2007; Schneider & Anderson, 2010; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005) 
asymmetrical effects of task switching have been reported where there is a greater switching 
cost on the easier of two tasks (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Meuter & Allport, 1999). These 
asymmetrical effects may reflect the inhibition of the easier of two tasks to enable the more 
difficult to be performed, at least when both tasks may be cued by the same stimulus. Here 
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the same facial stimulus was used and it is possible that one form of classification may need 
to be inhibited if it is applied more easily than the other. As a candidate for this is emotion 
classification, since prior work indicates that facial emotion can be categorized 
automatically, even when participants can not consciously report on the presence of the face 
(Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001). In contrast to this, there is evidence that gender information is 
not automatically categorized at least with famous faces (Quinn, Mason, & Macrae, 2009). 
Equivalent data on the retrieval of occupation information from faces has not been derived 
making it difficult to predict performance in this case. Following these results, then I may 
predict that switch costs may be relatively large on emotion classification, when compared 
with the gender and occupation classification tasks, due to the need to suppress emotion 
classification when one of the other tasks is being performed. One prior experiment has been 
conducted explicitly comparing two of the tasks used here, gender and emotion classification 
to faces. Reimers and Maylor (2005) found that switch-costs were smaller for gender than 
for the emotion classification. In their study, emotion classification was performed faster 
than the gender classification under baseline conditions, so that the differential switch costs 
may reflect the relative ease of the two tasks rather than the automaticity and need to inhibit 
emotion classification. Whether this necessarily holds was tested here using stimuli for 
which, if anything, emotion classification was the easier task. 
3.2. Intelligence (IQ) and Emotional Intelligence (EI) 
Various definitions of EI exist in the literature; According to the trait model by 
Goleman (1995) EI reflects interplay of five domains: knowing one’s own emotions; 
motivation; recognising and understanding other people’s emotion; managing one’s own 
emotions; managing other’s emotions. Salovey and Mayer (1990), in contrast, define EI as 
the ability to perceive and express emotion, the ability to regulate emotion, and the ability to 
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utilize emotions when solving problems. BarOn (1997) proposes that EI is an umbrella term 
reflecting multiple non-cognitive capabilities, competencies, and skills required in coping 
with environmental demands and pressures. Whichever model holds, EI is known to 
correlate with performance on a range of everyday life tasks. For example, high EI is 
associated with greater confidence in career decision making (Brown, George-Curran, & 
Smith, 2003), self-integrated personal goals (Spence, Oades, & Caputi, 2004), and managing 
positive relationship with others (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003). In contrast, low EI is 
associated with alcohol related problems (Schutte, Malouff, & Hine, 2011), disordered 
eating (Costarelli & Demerzi, 2009), borderline personality disorders (Leible & Snell, 2004), 
and lower gambling self-efficacy (Kaur, Schutte & Thorsteinsson, 2006). 
In a comprehensive analysis of different EI measures, Barchard and Hakstian (2004) 
reported that the self-report measures of EI do not correlate with IQ, rather seen as measures 
of self-perceptions of emotional abilities. The ability-based measures of EI have two factors: 
emotional congruence and social perceptiveness. Emotional congruence refers to the 
perceived affective quality of the stimulus and is relatively independent of the traditional 
cognitive abilities while social perceptiveness refers to the understanding of interpersonal 
relations and the relationship between emotion and behaviour in various situations, has 
moderate correlation with the verbal ability and the inductive reasoning. Here I assessed 
whether different aspects of EI could predict switching performance between face 
classification tasks. EI and IQ affects cognitive based performance, for example, high E/IQ 
is an advantage for cognitive based performance (see e.g., Lam & Kirby, 2002; Schutte, 
Schuettpelz, & Malouff, 2001). In contrast to EI, IQ refers more specifically to cognitive 
processes – specifically those dealing with the ability to reason, solve problems, think 
abstractly, comprehend complex ideas and learn quickly from experience (Gottfredson, 
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1994). Spearman (1904) proposed a general form of intelligence (g factor) underlying the 
success of different cognitive activities. IQ can be fractionated into fluid and crystallized 
intelligence (Cattell, 1971). Fluid IQ is ability to think logically, to solve problems, and 
reasoning with novel material, whereas Crystallized IQ is the ability to use acquired skills, 
knowledge, and experience. There is evidence that the factor of EI understanding of 
emotions (MSCEIT; Mayer-Salovey-Caruso EI test, 1999) correlates positively with the 
Crystallized IQ as measured by vocabulary and esoteric analogies tasks (Gf/Gc Quickie test 
battery; Stankov, 1997) among university students (Farrelly & Austin, 2007). 
EI and IQ are not synonymous; EI is more closely related to crystallized                                       
compared with fluid ability (see e.g., Farrelly & Austin, 2007; MacCann et al., 2004; 
Zeidner et al., 2005). In contrast, fluid intelligence is related to executive functions (Duncan, 
Burgess, & Emslie, 1995; Unsworth & Engle, 2008), and higher fluid intelligence leads to 
reduced switch costs (Salthouse, 1998).  Here I set out to assess differences in making face 
emotion, gender, and occupation categorization tasks in relation to IQ and EI measures taken 
on the same participants. It may be predicted that participants with higher IQs would be able 
to switch between face dimensions more easily than those with lower IQs, given that task 
switching might generally be easier for high IQ participants. On the other hand, given the 
evidence that EI can affect the processing of emotion, it can be predicted that participants 
high in EI may process facial emotion more easily than those low in EI, and consequently 
that they may switch more easily from emotion decisions into other decisions about faces, 
and perhaps more easily from the gender and occupation decision tasks into the face emotion 
decision task. Also prior work on task switching has demonstrated there can be asymmetrical 
performance where, counter-intuitively, there is slower switching from the harder into the 
easier of the two tasks (Allport et al., 1994). If emotion processing is facilitated for high EI 
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individuals, then it is possible that they may have to inhibit emotion processing when other 
properties of faces are discriminated. If this is the case then individuals high in EI may show 
relatively slow switching into the emotional decision tasks from other decisions. We can also 
make some neuroanatomical predictions. The processes of inhibition and activation of task-
sets are functions of the prefrontal cortex. For example, patients with left prefrontal lesions 
show impairments in task-set activation while patients with right frontal lesions show 
difficulty in task-set inhibition (e.g., Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivry, & Keele, 2006; see also Aron, 
Monsell et al., 2004). Given that frontal lobe functions are linked to aspects of intelligence 
(Duncan, Burgees, & Emslie, 1995) - we would expect IQ to link to task switching ability. 
The neural basis of EI has not been investigated in detail, so neuroanatomically-motivated 
predictions are difficult to make in this case. 
In addition, I investigated whether there is differential switching performance when 
contrasting aspects of faces have to be classified and whether task switching effects with 
faces correlate with EI and IQ? I report three experiments which were carried out under the 
same general paradigm. The tasks were self-paced and each task was performed in 4 blocks 
of 16 trials (8 blocks in total), where the task to be performed was cued by the background 
colour which stimuli were presented on. The stimuli were comprised of 16 photos of 8 
famous singers and actors with each depicting a happy and a neutral facial expression. Half 
of these photos were of women. The 4 singers were Robbie Williams, Paul McCartney, 
Britney Spears, Madonna; while the 4 actors were Daniel Radcliffe, Rowan Atkinson, Kate 
Winslet, and Elizabeth Taylor. In different experiments, participants were asked to make 
emotion, gender or occupation decisions. Pilot testing ensured that the famous faces were 
recognizable by the sample population, and efforts were made to equate the famous faces in 
terms of stimulus quality (e.g., resolution) as well as face angle, race (white), facial 
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expression (positive & neutral), and attractiveness. Half of the pictures portrayed smiling 
faces with obvious teeth. 
3.3. Experiment 1: gender-emotion task switching  
3.3.1. Method 
Participants. 16 undergraduate and postgraduate students from Cadbury College and the 
University of Birmingham took part in the study. There were 10 female and 06 males; ages 
16-25 years (mean 20.43 years). All had with normal colour vision. None had participated in 
a similar experiment. None had reported any injury, disease or eye surgery.  
Materials and displays 
The stimuli were 16 facial photographs which were same for the two tasks except 
that they were presented against blue and grey backgrounds while backgrounds related to the 
task (gender or emotion classification) were counterbalanced over the participants. The 
experiment was designed in E-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002, 
version 1.2). All stimuli were presented in the center of a 14 inch laptop screen. The 
participants responded by pressing keys set on the keyboard: 1=male; 2=female; happy=3; 
neutral=4. The display consisted of a fixation cross (+), presented in 18 point, courier new 
font, black= (0,0,0) against a white background followed by the blank white screen for 1000 
ms appeared before the presentation of each picture for an indefinite time (until the 
response). The participants were presented with alternating blocks of the gender and the 
emotion classification tasks. For half of the participants, the experiment started with the 
presentation of emotion task. This was counterbalanced across participants. 
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Fig. 3.1.Stimuli and displays for the emotion and gender task. 
 
BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory. The BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory (BarOn 
EQ-i) is a measure of EI. It is composed of 133 brief statements such as “I believe in my 
ability to handle most upsetting problems” and employs a five-point response set ranging 
from 1 (not true of me) to 5 (true of me). The completion time generally is 30-40 minutes. 
The Total EI score is a general indication of how emotionally intelligent the respondent is 
and how successful the individual is in coping with environmental demands. The overall EI 
score is based on five EI composite scale scores: Interpersonal EI, Intrapersonal EI, 
Adaptability EI, Stress management EI, and General mood EI. Interpretation of scores are 
130+ = atypically well-developed emotional capacity, 120-129= extremely well developed 
emotional capacity, 110-119= well-developed emotional capacity, 90-109 = adequate 
emotional capacity, 80-89= underdeveloped emotional capacity, 70-79= extremely 
underdeveloped emotional capacity, under 70= atypically underdeveloped emotional 
capacity. The alpha reliability of BarOn EQ-i is between .60 and .70. There is a low 
correlation with IQ (e.g., as measured by Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; WAIS, 
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Wechsler, 1958) and it fails to correlate with the Factor B of 16PF (thought to tap verbal, 
numerical, and logical reasoning aspects of cognitive intelligence) (BarOn, 1997). 
National Adult Reading Test. NART (Nelson & Willison, 1991) is a measure of verbal 
intelligence based on a 50-item, single word reading test. All the words are irregular and 
violate grapheme-phoneme correspondence rules. The participant is required to read out loud 
these irregularly pronounced words, which become progressively more difficult (for 
example, ‘chord’, ‘superfluous’ and’ demesne’). The NART VIQ estimate was calculated 
using Blair and Spreen ‘s original equation [NART VIQ estimate = 128.7-.89 (NART 
errors)]. 
Procedure 
Each participant arrived at the experimental room individually, and was given an 
informed consent form to review and sign. Upon consent, participants were given a 
description of the procedure. Each participant was administered the BarOn EQ inventory and 
the NART. Next, participants were seated before the computer screen at a comfortable 
viewing distance (approximately 60 cm). They were told that this was a reaction time 
experiment, and that they must respond by pressing the fixed keys on keyboard as quickly as 
possible without sacrificing accuracy. The stimuli and the tasks were then explained as 
gender and emotion classification. They were told that on each trial, participants were 
presented with facial photographs and they were required to classify the gender 
(male/female) or the emotion (happy/neutral) of the face by pressing fixed keys on the 
keyboard. The participants completed 128 trials of the gender and emotion task. Following 
the experiment, the results were saved and participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
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3.3.2. Results 
The data from first two blocks were discarded because there was no task switch for 
the block 1 and there would have been unequal numbers of trials per switching block if we 
had included block 2. Response times (RTs) were excluded above 2.5 standard deviations 
from each participants’ mean along with responses longer than 3,000 ms or shorter than 100 
ms. Participants’ mean RTs were calculated on switch (1-4) and  repeat (5-16) trials of each 
block in both  tasks. Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with trial (switch vs. repeat) and task (emotion vs. gender) as within subject 
factors. The main effect of trial F (1, 15) =113.86, MSE= 20447.44, p<0.001, ηp2=.88 was 
significant. RTs on switch trials (M=1124 ms) were slower than on repeat trials (M= 743 
ms). The main effect of the task F (1, 15) =13.23, MSE= 10259.92, p<0.01, ηp2=.46 was 
significant. RTs for the emotion (M=888 ms) task were faster than RTs for the gender task 
(M=980 ms). The interaction between trial and task failed to reach significance F< 1 
(fig.3.2). Across both switch and repeat trials the emotion task was performed faster than the 
gender task (t (15) = 3.17 and 3.12 respectively; both, p<0.01). 
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Fig. 3.2a. Mean reaction times (ms) for the switch and repeat trials in the emotion task in experiment 1. Error 
bars correspond to the average standard error.  
 
 
Fig. 3.2b. Mean reaction times (ms) for the switch and repeat trials in the gender task in experiment 1. Error 
bars correspond to the average standard error.  
To assess the effects of EI partial correlations were carried out based on the  mean 
switch cost across the emotion and gender  tasks (RT switch minus RT repeat trials) and the 
total EI scores, controlling for the NART VIQ scores1 because of the high inter-correlations. 
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This was reliable (r = -.77, p<0.001). For the emotion task alone there remained a correlation 
between the switch cost and the total EI scores (r = -.72, p<0.001). However, for the gender 
task this failed to reach significance (r = -.45, p=.08) (see fig.3.3 and table 3.1 for mean 
scores). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Similar correlations were run against the different sub-scores of the EI measure. Essentially, similar 
results occurred across all scores and therefore only the data on the amalgamated score are reported 
here - see the tables of the additional correlations in Appendix A. 
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Fig. 3.3a.Correlation between the switch cost for the emotion task and EI scores in experiment 1 (controlling 
for IQ). 
 
 
Fig. 3.3b.Correlation between switch cost for the gender task and the EI scores in experiment 1 (controlling for 
IQ). 
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controlling now for variation in EI scores. The correlation was reliable for both the emotion 
task and the gender task (r = -.63, p<0.01, and r = -.53, p<0.05, respectively) (see fig.3.4). 
 
Fig. 3.4a.Correlation between the switch cost for the emotion task in experiment 1 and the IQ scores 
(controlling for EI). 
 
Fig. 3.4b.Correlation between the switch cost for the gender task in experiment 1and the IQ scores (controlling 
for EI). 
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Table 3.1 
Mean switch costs for the emotion-gender task, for the NART VIQs and the BarOn EQ-i 
scores 
Switch cost emotion-gender task NART VIQ BarOn EQ-i 
      M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD) 
 
382 (143.00) 
 
120 (7.47) 
 
92.62 (7.03) 
 
The error rate was low and there was no evidence of speed-accuracy trade-off. The results 
are presented in table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 
Mean percentages (and standard deviation) of errors in the emotion and gender task 
       Emotion      Gender  
% (SD) % (SD) % (SD) % (SD) 
Switch Repeat Switch Repeat 
 
4 (.02) 
 
5 (.03) 
 
4 (.02) 
 
3 (.04) 
 
Switching Effects and IQ 
The high and low IQ groups were separated on the basis of median split for IQ scores 
(median value= 110) and participants’ mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial (switch vs. repeat), task (emotion vs. gender), and 
IQ (high vs. low) as within subject factors. The main effect of trial F (1, 6) =148.64, MSE = 
1991725.39, p<0.001, ηp2=.96 was significant. Switch trials (M=1124 ms) were slower than 
repeat trials (M= 746 ms). The main effect of task was also reliable F (1, 6) =7.94, MSE = 
127455.35, p<0.05, ηp2=.57. Emotion classification (M=887 ms) was faster than the gender 
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classification (M=983 ms). The main effect of IQ F (1, 6) =29.88, MSE = 310112.60, 
p<0.01, ηp2=.83 was significant. RTs for the low IQ group (M=1009.85 ms) were slower 
than the high IQ group (M= 861 ms). The interaction between trial and IQ was significant F 
(1, 6) =22.29, MSE = 176554.69, p<0.01, ηp2=.78. The switch cost for the high IQ group 
was less than the low IQ group [t (6) = 4.72, p<0.01, M=264.88 vs. 489.48 ms]. 
Switching Effects and EI 
The high and low EI groups were separated on the basis of median split for EI scores 
(median value= 91) and participants’ mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial (switch vs. repeat) x task (emotion vs. gender), and 
EI (high vs. low) as within subject factors. The main effect of trial F (1, 7) =979.37, MSE = 
232861.0, p<0.001, ηp2=.99 was significant. Switch trials (M=1124 ms) were slower than 
repeat trials (M= 746 ms). The main effect of task was also reliable F (1, 7) =16.23, MSE = 
135754.4, p<0.01, ηp2=.69. Emotion classification (M=887 ms) was faster than the gender 
classification (M=983 ms). The main effect of EI F (1, 7) =9.84, MSE = 222030.6, p<0.01, 
ηp2=.58 was significant. RTs for the low EI group (M=992 ms) were slower than the high EI 
group (M= 874 ms). The interaction between trial and IQ was significant F (1, 7) =19.89, 
MSE = 214566.9, p<0.01, ηp2=.74. The switch cost for the high EI group was less than the 
low EI group [t (7) = 4.46, p<0.01, M=265.65 vs. 497.26 ms]. 
3.3.3. Discussion 
The emotion task was performed overall faster than the gender task here, presumably 
reflecting the ease of detecting facial emotion in these stimuli. This did not interact with task 
switching. It is also consistent with prior results suggesting that the facial emotion is 
classified automatically (Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001) while face gender is not, at least for 
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famous faces (Quinn, Mason, & Macrae, 2009).  The emotion and gender classification tasks 
were nevertheless matched for their switch costs, suggesting that asymmetric switch costs do 
not necessarily arise simply because tasks differ in difficulty. Asymmetric switch costs may 
arise when one stimulus is easy to engage attention on. For example, the increased ease of 
selecting one stimulus may require that it is suppressed to enable the more difficult stimulus 
to be selected (as with asymmetric switch costs for Stroop stimuli; see Allport & Wylie, 
1994). In the present case there may not be any differential ease of selecting facial emotion 
rather than gender even though the emotions were easier to discriminate. 
Over and above this, I found that there were reliable correlations between the task 
switch costs and both EI and IQ- the higher the EI and IQ scores, the lower the switch costs. 
For the EI measure, switch costs tended to be more related to performance in the emotion 
task relative to the gender task. EI is positively associated with the skill in emotion 
recognition in faces (Ciarrochi, Chan & Bajgar, 2001). This might be reflected by increased 
attention/an increased ability to select emotional cues and this may reduce switch costs in 
individuals high in EI. 
The correlation between the switching data and IQ is also of interest. Dumotheil, 
Thompson, and Duncan (2011) argued that aspects of IQ are related to cognitive processes 
typically associated with operations of the frontal lobes of the brain, including task 
switching. Although Duncan’s argument primarily relates to ‘fluid’ as opposed to 
‘crystallized’ intelligence, the crystallized measure provided by the NART may in turn 
reflect some underlying differences in fluid intelligence across individuals. To the extent that 
such differences reflect frontal lobes/executive processes, we may expect task switching to 
be easier in individuals with increased IQ. The results also fit with the argument that 
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individuals with greater executive resources are better able to re-configure task sets, when 
switches take place (Salthouse et al., 1998). 
3.4. Experiment 2: emotion-occupation task switching 
Experiment 2 tested whether the previous results generalized to the pairing of 
emotion judgments with tasks requiring face recognition – in this case occupation decisions. 
To judge the occupation of a face requires that participants access stored knowledge about 
the person – and the underlying cognitive processes may different from those involved in 
gender classification (in experiment 1). Do task switching effects remain equivalent, are 
switches generally influenced by IQ and are emotion judgments in particular modulated by 
EI? 
3.4.1. Method 
Method was the same as in experiment 1 except where noted. 
Participants. 16 undergraduate and postgraduate students from Cadbury College and             
University of Birmingham took part in the study. There were 10 females and 6 males with 
ages between 16 and 23 years (mean 20.70 years). All had normal colour vision. None had 
participated in a similar experiment. None had reported any injury, disease or eye surgery.  
    Materials and displays 
       The materials and the displays were the same as in experiment 1 except that the 
participants were presented with eight alternating blocks of the emotion and occupation 
tasks. For half of the participants, the experiment started with the emotion task. This was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
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Procedure 
The procedure was same as in experiment 1 except that the tasks involved emotion 
and occupation decision. On each trial, participants were presented with facial pictures and 
they were required to classify the emotion (happy/neutral) or the occupation (actor/singer) of 
the individual photographed. There were 128 experimental trials for each of the emotion and 
occupation tasks. 
3.4.2. Results 
The data from first two blocks were discarded in order to equate the numbers of trials 
in the two tasks given that there was no task switch for block 1 (and so these data could not 
be included in the design). For each remaining block outliers were removed and response 
times (RTs) were excluded above 2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean. 
Responses longer than 3,000 ms or shorter than 100 ms were also omitted. Participants’ 
mean RTs were calculated for the switch (1-4) and the repeat (5-16) trials of each block in 
both tasks. 
The mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with trial (switch vs. repeat) and task (emotion vs. occupation) as within subject 
factors. The main effect of trial F (1, 15) = 112.63, p<0.001, MSE = 5914.73, ηp2=.88 was 
significant. RTs on switch trials (M = 958 ms) were slower than those on the repeat trials (M 
= 754 ms). The main effect of task F (1, 15) =12.59, MSE = 9329.14, p<0.01, ηp2=.45 was 
significant. RTs for the emotion (M =813 ms) task were faster than for the occupation (M = 
899 ms) task. The interaction between trial and task failed to reach significance F (1, 15) = 
.28, p=.59, MSE = 4462.54, ηp2=.01. The data are depicted in figure 3.5. 
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Fig. 3.5a. Mean reaction times (ms) for the switch and repeat trials in the emotion task in experiment 2. Error 
bars correspond to the average standard error.  
 
 
Fig.3.5b. Mean reaction times (ms) for the switch and repeat trials in the occupation task experiment 2. Error 
bars correspond to the average standard error.  
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The error rate was low and there was no evidence of speed-accuracy trade-off. The error data 
are presented in table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 
Mean Percentages (standard deviation) of error rate in the emotion-occupation task 
       Emotion      Occupation  
% (SD) % (SD) % (SD) % (SD) 
Switch Repeat Switch Repeat 
 
5 (.02) 
 
3 (.03) 
 
5 (.02) 
 
4 (.04) 
 
Partial correlations were carried out comparing the relations between the switch costs 
and IQ and EI, with EI and IQ respectively accounted for because of the high inter-
correlations. There was a reliable relation between the mean switch cost for the emotion task 
and the total EI scores (r = -.67, p<0.01). In contrast, the correlation between the switch cost 
for the occupation task and the total EI score was not reliable (r = -.10, p =.69) (in both cases 
controlling for the NART VIQ scores2).  These data are presented in figure 3.6 (for the mean 
scores see table 3.4). 
 
 
 
 
2. Similar correlations were run against the different sub-scores of the EI measure. Essentially similar 
results occurred across all scores and therefore the data on the amalgamated score are reported here - 
see the tables of the additional correlations in the Appendix B. 
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Fig. 3.6a.Correlation between the Switch cost for the emotion task in experiment 2 and EI scores (controlling 
for IQ). 
 
Fig. 3.6b.Correlation between the Switch cost for the occupation task in experiment 2 and EI scores 
(controlling for IQ). 
Similar partial correlations were carried out between the mean switch cost for the 
emotion and occupation tasks and NART VIQ scores (in this case controlling for differences 
in EI because of the high inter-correlations) (r = -.63, p<0.05). The relation between the 
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switch cost for the occupation task and the NART VIQ scores was reliable (r = -.62, p<0.01) 
while there was no reliable relation between NART VIQ scores and the switch costs for the 
emotion task (r = -.08, p=.77) (with EI scores controlled) (fig. 3.7). 
Table 3.4 
Mean switch cost for the emotion-occupation task, NART VIQ and BarOn EQ-i scores 
Switch cost emotion-occupation task NART VIQ BarOn EQ-i 
      M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD) 
 
205 (76.90) 
 
124.87 (2.46) 
 
96.31 (6.06) 
 
 
Fig. 3.7a.Correlation between the switch cost for the emotion task in experiment 2 and IQ scores (controlled 
for EI). 
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Fig. 3.7b.Correlation between the switch cost for the occupation task in experiment 2 and IQ scores (controlled 
for EI). 
Switching Effects and IQ 
The high and low IQ groups were separated on the basis of median split for IQ scores 
(median value= 124) and participants’ mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial (switch vs. repeat) x task (emotion vs. occupation), 
and IQ (high vs. low) as within subject factors. The main effect of trial F (1, 5) =80.42, MSE 
= 493629.40, p<0.001, ηp2=.94 was significant. Switch trials (M=963 ms) were slower than 
repeat trials (M= 760 ms). The main effect of task was also reliable F (1, 5) =37.90, MSE = 
58937.98, p<0.01, ηp2=.88. Emotion classification (M=793 ms) was faster than the 
occupation task (M=1194 ms). The interaction between trial x IQ was significant F (1, 5) 
=7.50, MSE = 29584.94, p<0.05, ηp2=.60. The switch cost for the high IQ group was less 
than the low IQ group t (5) = 4.77, p<0.01, M=150 vs. 230 ms respectively].     
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Switching Effects and EI 
The high and low EI groups were separated on the basis of median split for EI scores 
(median value= 98) and participants’ mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial (switch vs. repeat) x task (emotion vs. occupation), 
and EI (high vs. low) as within subject factors. The main effect of trial F (1, 6) =274.46, 
MSE = 549531.3, p<0.001, ηp2=.97 was significant. Switch trials (M=945 ms) were slower 
than repeat trials (M= 746 ms). The main effect of task was also reliable F (1, 6) =9.72, MSE 
= 69644.84, p<0.05, ηp2=.61. Emotion classification (M=801 ms) was faster than the 
occupation task (M=881 ms). The interaction between trial x IQ was significant F (1, 6) 
=10.95, MSE = 45965.48, p<0.05, ηp2=.64. The switch cost for the high EI group was less 
than the low EI group t (6) = 21.51, p<0.001, M=132 vs. 275 ms respectively].     
3.4.3. Discussion 
The results broadly match those found in experiment 1. The emotion decision task 
was easier than the occupation decision task, but the two tasks did not differ in terms of the 
overall task switching costs. There was no overall evidence for easier task switching to 
emotion or for harder disengagement of attention from emotion. Over and above this, there 
were interesting differences in the pattern of switch costs for the two tasks in relation to the 
measures of IQ and EI. Only the switch cost for the emotion task had reliable correlation 
with the EI scores, which matches with earlier findings that the EI is positively correlated 
with the ability to recognize  emotion in faces (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Bajgar, 2001; see also 
experiment 1). In this case, though, there was no reliable correlation between switch costs 
and EI for the occupation decision task. This result indicates that EI does not strongly 
modulate the ability to access stored semantic knowledge about people from their face. In 
contrast, there were correlations between IQ and switch costs for the occupation task but not 
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for the emotion task. The relation between switching in the occupation task and IQ matches 
with earlier report of reduced switch costs in individuals with higher IQ (Salthouse et al., 
1998). The lack of an effect here with the emotion tasks suggests that emotion decision used 
somewhat different cognitive processes (related to EI not IQ) than occupation recognition, 
and the cognitive processes mediating emotion recognition are not necessarily related to 
general IQ. I return to discuss this result in the General Discussion. 
3.5. Experiment 3:  gender-occupation task switching 
In experiment 3, I examined the relations between task switching in the gender and occupation 
decision tasks. Since emotion-based responses were not required here, I can predict that EI 
may play a less influential role. 
3.5.1. Method 
Method was the same as in experiment 1 except where noted. 
Participants. 16 undergraduate and postgraduate students from Cadbury College or the 
University of Birmingham took part in the study. There were 9 females and 7 male; ages 18-
23 years (mean 20.00 years). All had normal colour vision. None had reported any injury, 
disease or eye surgery. None had participated in a similar experiment before. 
   Materials and displays 
  The materials and displays were same as in experiment 1. The participants were 
presented with eight alternating blocks of the gender and the occupation task. For half of the 
participants, experiment started with the presentation of gender block. This was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
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Procedure 
The procedure was same as in experiment 1 except that the tasks were gender and 
occupation decision. On each trial, participants were presented with the photographs and 
they were required to classify either the gender (male/female) or the occupation 
(actor/singer) of the face. There were 128 trials in each task. 
3.5.2. Results 
The mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
trial (switch vs. repeat) x task (occupation vs. gender) as within subject factors. The main 
effect of trial F (1, 15) =130.78, MSE = 17631.77, p<0.001, ηp2=.89 was significant. Switch 
trials (M=1184 ms) were slower than repeat trials (M= 804 ms). The main effect of task was 
also reliable F (1, 15) =69.04, MSE = 37160.32, p<0.001, ηp2=.82. Gender classification 
(M=793 ms) was faster than the occupation task (M=1194 ms). The interaction between the 
trial and task was significant F (1, 15) =8.32, MSE = 11026.85, p<0.05, ηp2=.35 (fig.3.8). 
For both the occupation and gender tasks, there were reliable switch costs. The switch cost 
was greater for the occupation than the gender task t (15) = 2.54, p<0.05.  Switch trials were 
slower on the occupation than the gender task t (15) = 6.89, p<0.001, while repeat trials were 
faster on gender compared to the occupation task t (15) = 9.20, p<0.001. 
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Fig.3.8a. Mean reaction times (ms) for the switch and repeat trials in the gender task in experiment 3. Error 
bars correspond to the average standard error.  
 
 
Fig. 3.8b. Mean reaction times (ms) for the switch and repeat trials in the occupation task in experiment 3. 
Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
As for experiments 1 and 2, partial correlations were conducted to assess the 
relations between task switching and EI and IQ (controlling for each factor in turn) because 
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of the high inter-correlations. There were no reliable relations between EI and task switching 
in either the occupation or gender task (r = -.08, p=.77, and r = -.05, p=.86)] with NAART 
VIQ scores controlled for.3 These data are presented in figure 3.9 (for mean scores, see table 
3.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Similar correlations were run against the different sub-scores of the EI measure with, essentially, 
similar results occurring across all scores. Therefore the data were reported on the amalgamated score 
only - see the tables of the additional correlations in the Appendix C. 
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Fig. 3.9a.Correlation between the switch cost for the occupation task in experiment 3and EI scores (controlled 
for IQ). 
                                                                              
 
Fig. 3.9b.Correlation between the switch cost for the gender task in experiment 3and EI scores (controlled for 
IQ). 
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Table 3.5 
Mean switch cost for the gender-occupation task, NART V IQ and BarOn EQ-i scores 
Switch cost gender-occupation task NART VIQ BarOn EQ-i 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
380 (132.78) 
 
 
112.43 (9.79) 
 
95.52 (4.56) 
 
The partial correlation between the mean switch cost for the occupation and  gender 
tasks and the NART VIQ scores (with EI scores controlled) was r = -.66 and r = -.51, p<.05, 
respectively) (fig.3.10). 
 
Fig. 3.10a.Correlation between switch cost for the occupation task and IQ scores (controlled for EI). 
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Fig. 3.10b.Correlation between switch cost for the gender task and IQ scores (controlled for EI). 
The error rate was low and there was no evidence of speed-accuracy trade-off. The results 
are presented in table 3.6.  
Table 3.6 
Mean percentages (standard deviation) of errors in gender-occupation tasks 
       Gender  Occupation  
% (SD) % (SD) % (SD) % (SD) 
Switch Repeat Switch Repeat 
 
5 (.03) 
 
2 (.04) 
 
4 (.02) 
 
5 (.03) 
 
Switching Effects and IQ 
The high and low IQ groups were separated considering median splits on IQ scores (median 
value=110) and participants’ mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with trial (switch vs. repeat) x task (occupation vs. gender), and IQ 
(high vs. low) as within subject factors. The main effect of trial F (1, 7) =339.96, MSE = 
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2305992.37, p<0.001, ηp2=.98 was significant. Switch trials (M=1184 ms) were slower than 
repeat trials (M= 804 ms). The main effect of task was also reliable F (1, 7) =100.16, MSE = 
2565857.28, p<0.001, ηp2=.93. Gender classification (M=793 ms) was faster than the 
occupation task (M=1194 ms). The interaction between the trial and task was significant F 
(1, 7) =5.73, MSE = 91798.78, p<0.05, ηp2=.45 (fig.3.8). For both the occupation and 
gender tasks, there were reliable switch costs. The switch cost was greater for the occupation 
than the gender task t (15) = 2.54, p<0.05.  Switch trials were slower on the occupation than 
the gender task t (15) = 6.89, p<0.001, while repeat trials were faster on gender compared to 
the occupation task t (15) = 9.20, p<0.001. The interaction between the task and IQ was 
significant F (1, 7) =5.571, MSE = 167552.38, p<0.05, ηp2=.44. For both groups, gender 
categorization was faster than the occupation categorization [high IQ group, t (7) = 25.28, 
p<0.001, M=804 vs. 1102 ms; low IQ group, t (7) = 8.17, p<0.001, M=783 vs. 1286 ms 
respectively].     
Switching Effects and EI 
The high and low EI groups were separated by considering median splits on EI scores 
(median value=98) and participants’ mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial (switch vs. repeat) x task (occupation vs. gender), 
and EI (high vs. low) as within subject factors. The main effect of trial F (1, 2) =135.5, MSE 
= 932941.8, p<0.01, ηp2=.98 was significant. Switch trials (M=1222 ms) were slower than 
repeat trials (M= 828 ms). The main effect of task was also reliable F (1, 2) =123.18, MSE = 
1203808.84, p<0.01, ηp2=.98. Gender classification (M=801 ms) was faster than the 
occupation task (M=1249 ms). The only reliable interaction was between task and EI [F (1, 
2) =31.89, MSE = 352330.02, p<0.05, ηp2=.94]. For both groups, gender categorization was 
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faster than the occupation categorization [high EI group, t (2) = 7.84, p<0.01, M=782 vs. 988 
ms; low IQ group, t (12) = 8.65, p<0.001, M=795 vs. 1240 ms respectively].     
3.5.3. Discussion 
As in experiments 1 and 2, I found reliable switch costs when participants carried out 
different classification tasks to faces.  Unlike the results when one task was emotion decision 
making, there was an asymmetry in the switch costs here, with occupation classification 
yielding larger switch costs than the gender classification. This result runs counter to the 
argument that switch costs reflect the automaticity of classification (with the automatic task 
showing larger switch costs due to the need for it to be inhibited; see Allport & Wylie, 
1998), since, occupation classification is less likely to be an automatic procedure than the 
gender classification (though see Quinn, Mason, & Macrae, 2009 for evidence against 
automatic gender classification of famous faces). In the present case, the results may reflect 
the relative ease of the two tasks, with gender classification being easier than the occupation 
classification. It may be easier to switch to the easier of two tasks at least when the easier 
task does not require inhibition to prevent it from operation (cf. Allport et al., 1994). Against 
this argument though, I found no asymmetric switch costs when emotion decisions were 
involved, even though emotion decisions were easier than gender and occupation decisions 
(experiments 1 and 2). The magnitude of the switch costs then may not only reflect relative 
task difficulty but also whether similar processes are in operation across the tasks. 
Differential switch costs, disrupting the more difficult of two tasks, may be generated when 
the task configurations are similar so that one has to be dismantled to avoid interference 
when the other task is required. Switch costs then may reflect the time taken to reconfigure 
the task set, which takes longer for the more difficult task. In contrast, emotion decisions 
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may call on different processes than gender and occupation decisions, and switching need 
not entail dismantling and reconfiguring new task sets. In this case, the more difficult of the 
two tasks does not suffer differentially. 
The argument that different processes may be involved in emotion relative to gender 
and occupation decisions is also supported by the results from the correlations with IQ and 
EI. EI correlated reliably with the switch costs to the emotion decision task, whereas EI 
showed weak or non-reliable correlations with switch costs in the gender and occupation 
tasks. This suggests that EI is not related to all aspects of task switching, but rather it more 
specifically links to the task switching and emotional judgments-participants with a high EI 
are better able to switch attend to and from facial emotions, compared with the participants 
with a low EI. This fits with the idea that EI relates to how well individuals can process 
facial emotions. For example, it may be that the task set to process facial emotion is in a 
consistently primed state for individuals with a high EI – with the result that there is fast 
switching to emotion decisions. As this applies only to emotion judgments, though, then 
individuals with a high EI are not advantaged in switching in other face processing tasks 
(gender and occupation decisions). 
In contrast to the null effect of EI here, there were reliable effects of IQ, with again 
(as in experiments 1 and 2), participants with a higher IQ better able to switch tasks than 
those with a lower IQ. Since this result occurred across all the current task pairings, it 
appears to reflect a general factor independent of the specific task. The result is consistent 
with the participants with higher IQs having more executive control and so they are better 
able to reconfigure a new task-set, and to discard the previous task-set, to enable the new 
task to be performed. 
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3.6. General Discussion 
There were two main aspects of the present study. The first was the relative ease of 
switching from one face classification task to another. The second was the relation between 
task performance, IQ and EI. 
3.6.1. Relative magnitudes of task switching costs 
 In experiments 1 and 2, task switching costs were equal when emotion decisions were 
paired with gender and occupation decision tasks, although the emotion task was overall 
easier. In experiment 3, when the gender and occupation decision tasks were paired, switch 
costs were larger for the more difficult task (occupation decision).  
Switching between tasks of unequal difficulty is often not symmetric (e.g., Allport, 
Styles, Hsieh, 1994; Wang et al., 2007; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005), with in many cases 
larger switching costs being found for the easier of two tasks. This has been attributed to the 
easier task being more automatically engaged by the stimuli, and with participants then 
having to inhibit that task to engage with the more difficult task (Allport et al., 1994). My 
data do not fit with this picture however. If I take the results for the gender and occupation 
tasks, it was the more difficult task (occupation decision) that suffered under switching 
conditions. I link this to two factors. One is that the tasks involve similar processes. When 
this is the case, participants may have to dismantle one task set in order to enable the similar 
task set to be instantiated when switching takes place. The second factor is that the task set 
takes longer to configure for more difficult tasks. Hence, when switching involves setting up 
a new task configuration, the more difficult task suffers. 
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As well as finding asymmetric effects with gender and occupation decisions, I found 
additive effects of switching and task when emotion decisions were paired with both gender 
and occupation decision tasks. This occurred even though emotion decisions were easier 
than the other decision tasks. To explain this I suggest that emotion decisions engage 
separate cognitive processes to gender and occupation decisions, and that task configurations 
that are distinct can be maintained in parallel (without the need to dismantle each 
configuration when a switch is required). There may then be switch costs due to having to 
stop one task, but the effects of this can be equal across tasks that differ in difficulty (as I 
observed). One caveat here is that the only emotion task examined was to decide whether 
faces are happy or not. Decisions about whether faces depict a happy emotion are typically 
efficient and easier than many other types of emotion judgment. It may be that the advantage 
for the emotion task, and the particular pattern of task switching effects, are limited to 
decisions about whether faces are or are not happy. The generality of the present results need 
to be assessed across a broader range of emotions. 
3.6.2. Effects of EI and IQ 
The second aim of the study was to assess any differential affects of EI and IQ on 
task switching performance. There was a reliable relationship between task switching and IQ 
- participants with a higher IQ were better able to switch between tasks than those with a 
lower IQ with the exception of the emotion decision task in experiment 2, where a non-
reliable trend was apparent). This fits with the idea that people with higher IQ have greater 
executive control (Salthouse et al., 1998) and with previous results showing that measures of 
IQ have an inverse correlation with mixing costs in task switching procedures (Yehene & 
Meiran, 2007). Though it has been argued that executive control processes are better linked 
to fluid than crystallized IQ (Duncan, & Burgess, & Emslie, 1995), and though I used a 
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crystallized IQ measure (the NART), it is nevertheless the case that fluid and crystallized IQ 
are closely related and that individuals with higher fluid IQ will likely achieve high 
crystallized IQ scores too.   
The pattern of performance in relation to EI differed from that in relation to IQ. EI 
correlated reliably with switch costs to the emotion decision task but not with switch costs in 
the other tasks – individuals with a higher EI showed reduced switch costs for emotion 
decisions. EI scores have previously been shown to be positively associated with skill at 
identifying emotional expressions in faces (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Bajgar, 2001). To account for 
the present results, I suggest that emotion decisions are in a primed state for individuals with 
a high EI, and so these decisions are readily engaged in when participants must switch from 
either a gender or occupation decision task into the emotion decision task. The different 
patterns of correlation for the emotion decision task compared with the gender and 
occupation decisions also supports the argument made above that emotion decisions rely on 
different cognitive processes to gender and occupation decisions, and so there can be 
contrasting patterns of relationship with trait factors such as EI. There are neurological 
dissociations between face recognition, gender decision and emotion decision making, for 
example patients following brain injury can judge emotion but no other information from the 
faces (see e.g., Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993). There is functional imaging data 
indicating the emotion decisions can be mediated through specific sub-cortical pathways 
(through the amygdala) whereas occupation and gender decisions engage cortical processes 
in the ventral visual stream (see Sergent, Ohta, MacDonald, 1992; Sergent, Ohta, 
MacDonald, Zuck, 1994; also Haxby, Hoffman, and Gobbini, 2000) – all of which would 
indicate that emotions rely on different neural and cognitive processes to occupation and 
gender decisions. An interesting direction for future research would be to examine the neural 
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substrates of EI in emotion decisions – is there greater amygdala activity for individuals high 
in EI? 
3.6.3. Conclusion 
I conclude that the asymmetric switch costs between different attributes of a face represent 
the relative ease of the task, not the automaticity, when task sets are similar. However, 
emotion decision tasks seem separable from gender and occupation decisions and so not 
subject to asymmetric switch costs. In addition, while switching between different tasks 
seems related to IQ, only switching to emotion decisions seems related to EI. 
3.6.4. Limitations 
The current study focused on switching mechanisms related to happy emotion only which 
potentially limits the generalizability given that the happy faces are the fastest to detect. The 
comparisons to gender and occupation are therefore constrained by this. The use of 
crystallized IQ measure limits is a constraint on drawing the conclusions about the 
contribution of IQ in the switching ability. The sample size is low which limits the 
interpretation of null effects of the EI in relation to the gender and occupation 
categorizations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CULTURAL EFFECTS IN EMOTION AND GENDER RECOGNITION 
Abstract 
Chapter 4 examines task switching between emotion and gender decisions to faces for 
individuals drawn from Western (White UK citizens) and Asian (Pakistani) cultures. These 
cultures differ in how they respond to emotion and gender information. There were 3 main 
results of interest. (1) There was a double dissociation between gender and emotion 
classifications across the participant populations – Western participants were faster to make 
gender than emotion classifications while Asian participants were faster to make emotion 
than gender classifications. It is argued that the different patterns of results reflect the greater 
attentional weight given to contrasting face dimensions in the different cultures, plus also the 
dependence on using different attributes to make gender discriminations in individuals from 
varying cultures. (2) Asian participants showed smaller switch costs overall than White 
British participants. This result may be attributed to effects of bilingualism in the Asian 
participants, which results in their having greater executive resource. (3) Emotion decisions 
showed larger switch costs than gender decisions but essentially because emotion decisions 
benefitted from priming on switch trials. It is argued that emotion decisions benefit from the 
activation of a specific processing module across consecutive trials. 
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People from different cultural backgrounds and races may classify faces in different 
ways. There is much work on the so-called “own race” effect, which arises when people 
show better performance when required to discriminate faces from their own race relative to 
faces from different races (e.g., Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 
2005; Correll, Lemoine, & Ma, 2005). This own-race advantage has been explored most 
thoroughly in studies where facial identity has had to be discriminated (Ge et al., 2009), but 
it has also been found in judgments of emotional expression (Pinkham et al., 2008) and 
gender (O’Toole, Peterson, Deffenbacher, 1996). Accounts of the own-race advantage differ. 
Some attribute it to differential perceptual sensitivity to own vs. other race faces: since we 
have more perceptual experience with faces from our own race compared with those of other 
races, so our perceptual system will be better tuned to own race faces (e.g., Brigham & 
Malpass, 1985; Goldstein & Chance, 1985; Kelly et al., 2007). An alternative account 
attributes the effects not to perceptual experience but to differential motivation (e.g., 
Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008).  
In addition to the differences in perceiving own and other race faces, a substantial 
research literature shows that there are clear cultural differences in cognitive and perceptual 
processes (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001; Lewis, Goto, & Kong, 2008; Gutchess, Welsh, 
Boduroglu, & Park, 2006; Hedden, Ketay, Aron, Markus, & Gabrieli, 2008). The results of 
these studies consistently show that East Asians tend to be more sensitive to contextual 
information whereas Westerners pay more attention on focal processes (e.g., objects in a a 
scene rather than the whole scene itself). Nisbett et al. (2001) suggest that East Asians pay 
attention to the entire field (holistically) whereas Westerners are more analytical and pay 
attention primarily to individual objects. Similar line of studies demonstrates cultural 
differences in cognitive style. For example, when participants were asked to report what they 
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observed in a water scene. Japanese participants reported more background related 
information focusing on the colour of the water, small non-moving objects, rocks etc. while 
Americans noticed more attributes (rapid movement, bright colour, etc.) related to the focal 
objects (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). In other studies it has been shown that Chinese attend to 
the background in a scene more than the Americans while Americans fixate more on focal 
objects (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005). These data are supported by electrophysiological 
results. Western participants display greater target P3 amplitudes (which serve as an index of 
the attention paid to target events) while East Asians displayed greater novelty-based P3 
amplitudes, which are considered as markers of the attention paid to contextually deviant 
events (Lewis, Goto, & Kong, 2008). There is evidence of cultural variation in how people 
attend to faces –face perception is based on more configural processing among Easterners 
than in westerners. These cultural variations extend to the face perception, when asked to 
choose a prototypic face for a set of examplars, Japanese choose more configural faces 
(configurations created by blending of facial features of the four faces defined by ethnicity 
and gender while maintaining overall gestalt) compared to the Americans suggesting more 
reliance of Japanese on overall resemblance (overall gestalt) rather than featural matching. In 
a speeded identity matching task, when the configural changes were manipulated by the 
changes in spacing between individual features, Japanese identified spacing differences more 
accurately than the Americans (Miyamoto, Yoshikawa, & Kitayama, 2011). Blais et al. 
(2008) monitored eye movement of Western and Asian observers when observers 
categorized own and other race faces. The results demonstrated a differential strategy 
employed by the observers in Asian and western cultures to extract visual information from 
faces-East Asians focused more on the central face region which is instrumental to integrate 
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information holistically (nose) and is most advantageous to capture global face information 
while Western Caucasian observers focused more across facial features. 
 Essentially, participants are more motivated to process faces from their own race 
compared to other races, and for this reason are more sensitive to own-race faces. Though 
investigated much less than the effects of race on face identity judgments, people from 
different races and cultures may differ in other classifications performed on faces (e.g., 
Hugenberg, Young, & Sacco, 2010). Gender classification, in particular, may differ across 
individuals with different cultural backgrounds. For example, in Western cultures women 
can be distinguished from men on the basis of make-up and hairstyle, in addition to 
differences in facial structure. In contrast, women in Asian cultures may cover their hair and 
wear minimal makeup making gender discrimination dependent on different factors, such as 
facial structure. On a motivational level, Western and Asian participants may differ in the 
‘weight’ they attach to gender-for example, gender may be weighted relatively strongly in 
Asian cultures, as it may be a critical dimension along which people are classified.  
There may be several cognitive consequences of this. For example, weighting gender 
strongly may mean that it becomes more difficult to switch from gender classification to 
other classification tasks. This was tested here, with Western and Asian participants being 
examined when switching between gender and emotion judgments. Was there a selective 
slowing on emotion judgments for Asian participants following a gender classification trial, 
due to slow disengagement from the gender task? By examining emotion as well as gender 
classification I also evaluated whether emotion was discriminated in a universal fashion 
across cultures (Ekman et al., 1978; Izard, 1994), or whether cultural differences might again 
arise-for example, there may be slow classification of facial emotion for participants in 
cultures where the norm is to suppress emotions (Kim et al., 2011). 
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In 2 different experiments, participants classified facial emotion and gender in 
alternating trial blocks. Experiment 1 and 2 differed only in that the expressed emotions 
were chosen to be more salient in experiment 1, in order to assess whether this could help 
minimize cultural differences on emotion judgments as the contrasting emotional 
expressions should become easier to discriminate. Following Wylie and Allport (2000), task 
switching was examined across blocks of trials, with the first trials in the block classed as 
‘switch’ trials and the remaining as ‘non-switch’ trials. I tested White English participants 
and South-Asian/Pakistani individuals, to contrast performance across two cultures where 
gender may be differentially weighted. In Western societies, gender is signaled by external 
features such as make-up in addition to differences in facial structure and hairstyle that may 
differentiate men and women (e.g., Bruce et al., 1993; Chronicle et al., 1993; Stephen & Mc 
Keegan, 2010). In South Asian/ Pakistani society, the presence of such external features may 
be less obvious so that gender recognition may need to be turned to less superficial 
differences. In addition, Western and South-Asian/Pakistani societies may differentially 
weight gender as an intrinsic aspect of individual identity. In Western societies, individuals 
are not necessarily classified by their gender - at least when they are familiar (Quinn, Mason, 
& Macrae, 2009). In contrast, south-Asian/Pakistani societies are closely stratified by 
gender, and this may mean that gender is an important aspect of face categorization. The 
consequence may be that the gender of a face is classified rapidly and/or that it is difficult to 
disengage attention from facial gender after gender has been categorized. The consequence 
may be that it is difficult to switch from classifying the gender of a face to classifying 
another attribute. 
Along with differences in classifying facial gender, individuals from contrasting 
cultures may also vary in responsitivity to facial emotion. Following the early work of 
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Ekman (1978), there has been considerable interest in cross cultural differences in 
responding to facial emotion. Ekman argued that facial emotions were universally classified 
in terms of basic configurations of muscle responses. Other studies, however, have suggested 
differences in emotion identification across contrasting cultures (see e.g., Mandal et al., 
2010; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Matsumoto, 1992; Shioiri et al., 1999a) for example, 
among basic emotions, happiness is more accurately identifiable in Asian than in Western 
cultures (Shioiri et al., 1999b) possibly because Asian cultures encourage expression of 
positive emotions while discouraging the overt expression of negative emotions.  
According to the idea that emotions are classified in a universally uniform manner 
there may be few differences across different races and cultures in the speed of emotion 
classification and in the ability to switch to and from emotion classification. On the other 
hand, if there are cultural variations in the weight placed on emotions, then variations 
between Western and South Asian/ Pakistani individuals may arise either in the speed of 
emotion classification compared with other classifications or in the disengagement from 
emotion judgments on task switching trials. Performance was examined with 2 sets of 
stimuli (Asian & White faces) where the saliency of the emotion was varied. It is possible 
that cultural differences might emerge most clearly when the salience of the dimension is 
less apparent and, when a dimension is highly salient, effects of cultural factors on 
judgments may be swamped. 
4.1. Experiment 1: High saliency emotion 
4.1.1. Method 
Participants. 32 subjects (16 White- British, 16 South Asian-Pakistani) of age range 20-22 
years (mean 21.07 years) from the Universities of Birmingham and Bahauddin Zikariya 
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respectively took part. Half of them were female. All had normal colour vision, right hand 
preference and none had participated in a similar experiment. 
Materials and displays 
In pilot study, participants were asked to rate the emotional expression of 2 sets of 
photographs (South Asian &White British) “how would you describe the salience of happy 
emotion, on a scale from 1 to 10 (1= very poor salience, 10= excellent salience). Selected 
photographs were with mean (standard deviation) rating as: high salience {happy 8.87 (0.83) 
low salience {happy 1.87 (0.83)}, based on a sample of 30 participants from both cultures 
with inter-rater reliability =.80.  
The stimuli in each experiment were eight coloured photographs: ‘4 South- Asian’ 
and ‘4 White- British’. Half of them were posed with a happy and other half with a neutral 
facial expression. Of these 8 pictures, 4 were female faces. The individual stimuli were same 
for the two tasks except that they were portrayed with a high saliency (experiment 1) or a 
low saliency positive emotion (experiment 2), and were presented against blue or grey 
backgrounds (counter balanced across participants) to indicate which task had to be 
performed. The experiments were designed in E-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002, version 1.2). All stimuli were presented in the center of a 14 inch laptop 
screen. The participants responded by pressing different keys set on the keyboard: 1=male, 
2= female, 3= happy, 4= neutral. Each trial began with the fixation cross (+), in 18 point, 
Courier New font, black= 0,0,0 which appeared against a white background, followed by a 
blank white screen for 1000 ms, then a picture appeared until the response and participants 
judged either the emotion (happy/neutral) or the gender (male/female) of the face by 
pressing appropriate response keys (fig. 4.1). Participants were presented with eight 
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alternating blocks (4 block of each task) forming 128 experimental trials of the emotion and 
gender tasks. The tasks were counterbalanced across the participants. For half of the 
participants, the experiment started with presentation of the emotion block. This was 
counterbalanced across participants so that, for the other half of participants, the gender 
block was carried out first. 
Design and procedure 
The study received approval by the University of Birmingham Ethics Research Committee. 
Upon arrival, subjects were given an informed consent form and they were provided with a 
description of the procedure. Upon giving consent, they were seated before the computer 
screen at a comfortable viewing distance (approximately 60 cm). They were told that this 
was a reaction time experiment, and that they must identify emotion or gender of a face by 
pressing the fixed keys on keyboard as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy. The 
participants completed 128 experimental trials of the emotion and gender task.  After testing, 
subjects were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
4.2. Experiment 2: Low saliency emotion 
4.2.1. Method 
Method was the same as in experiment 1 except where noted. 
Participants. 32 subjects (16 White British, 16 South Asian-Pakistani) of age range 20-22 
years (mean 22.07 years) from the University of Birmingham and from Bahauddin Zikariya 
took part in the study. Half of them were female. All had normal colour vision, right hand 
preference and none had participated in a similar experiment. 
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Materials and displays 
 The stimuli along with displays were same as in experiment 1 except that a low saliency 
(with less pronounced smile) positive emotion was presented. 
Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were the same as in experiment 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.1. Emotion- gender task stimuli. 
 
4.2.2. Results 
The data from the first two blocks were discarded because there was no task switch for block 
1 and omitting that block alone would lead to uneven trial numbers. I subsequently removed 
response times (RTs) above 2.5 standard deviations from the participants’ mean. Responses 
longer than 3,000 ms or shorter than 100 ms were also omitted. Participants’ mean RTs were 
calculated on switch (trials 1-4) and repeat trials (trials 5-16) of each block in both tasks.  
Gender 
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Mean RTs were submitted to a mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial 
(switch vs. repeat) and task (emotion vs. gender) as within subject factors and experiment 
(salient vs. non salient) and race (Asian vs. British) as a between subject factors.  
The main effects of trial {F (1, 60) =559.36, p< 0.001, ηp2=.91}, task {F (1, 60) =4.02, p< 
0.05, ηp2=.06} and experiment {F (1, 60) =10.23, p< 0.01, ηp2=.01} were significant. 
Performance on switch trials (M=1034 ms) was slower than on repeat trials (M=746 ms). 
The emotion task (M=867 ms) was faster than the gender task (M= 904 ms). RTs in 
experiment 2 were faster than in experiment 1 (953 vs.827 ms respectively). The main effect 
of race failed to reach significance level {F (1, 60) =2.05, p= 0.15, ηp2=.03}. 
Trial x Task 
There was a significant interaction between trial and task F (1, 60) =11.96, MSE= 65121.86, 
p< 0.01, ηp2=.16 (fig.4.2). This interaction was further analyzed by separate repeated 
measures ANOVAs for both tasks with trial (switch vs. repeat; within subject) as a factor. 
There was a significant effect of trial on the emotion {F (1, 63) =392.85, MSE= 8291.02, p< 
0.001, ηp2=.86} and the gender task {F (1, 63)= 265.79, MSE= 7843.43, p<0.001, ηp2=.80}. 
Switch trials were slower than the repeat trials for both tasks: emotion task {t (63) = 19.82, 
p< 0.001}; gender task t (63) = 16.30, p< 0.001. The switch cost (RT switch minus repeat 
trials) was larger for the emotion than the gender task t (63) = 3.37, p< 0.01.  Repeat trials 
were faster for the emotion than the gender task t (63) = 4.08, p< 0.001; while there was no 
difference between the tasks on the switch trials t < 1. 
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Fig.4.2. Mean reaction times on the switch and repeat trials in the emotion and gender task. Error bars 
correspond to the average standard error.  
Trial, Task, Experiment, and Race  
There was a significant higher order interaction between trial, task, experiment, and 
race F (1, 60) =4.18, MSE= 5443.16, p< 0.05, ηp2=.06. This interaction was further analysed 
by separate repeated measures ANOVAs for both experiments with the factors being trial 
(switch vs. repeat; within subject) and race (Asian vs. British; between subjects) and another  
separate repeated measures ANOVA for both experiments with factors task (emotion vs. 
gender; within subject) and race (Asian vs. British; between subjects). These data are 
depicted in figures 4.3 and 4.4. For experiment 1 (high saliency emotion), there was 
significant interaction between trial and race F (1, 30) =7.22, MSE= 4714.33, p< 0.05, 
ηp2=0.19. British participants were slower than Asian participants on the switch trials t (15) 
=2.38, p< 0.05, in contrast, there was no difference between the participants on the repeat 
trials t <2. The switch cost (RT switch minus repeat trials) for the British participants were 
larger than the Asian participants t (15) = 4.41, p< 0.01 (319 vs. 227 ms respectively). For 
experiment 2 (low saliency emotion), there was no interaction between trial and race {F (1, 
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30)=0.95, MSE= 4494.36, p=0.33, ηp2=.03}. For experiment 1 (high saliency emotion), 
there was significant interaction between task and race F (1, 30) =17.99, MSE= 6434.53, p< 
0.01, ηp2=0.37. Asian participants responded faster to emotion than to gender t (15) = 5.75, 
p< 0.001, in contrast, British participants responded similarly to both emotion and gender t 
<2. For experiment 2 (low saliency emotion), again there was significant interaction 
between task and race F (1, 30) =22.41, MSE= 3712.52, p< 0.01, ηp2=0.42, Asian 
participants judged emotion faster than gender t (15) =4.25, p< 0.01, while the British 
participants showed the opposite pattern (gender < emotion, t (15) =2.94, p<0.05. The 
pattern of the interaction was similar across the different levels of saliency of the emotional 
stimuli (experiment 1 & 2). Asian participants were faster on the emotion task than the 
gender task. British participants tended to show the opposite result, particularly when the 
emotion was less salient. 
For both tasks, separate repeated measures ANOVAs with factors trial (switch vs. repeat; 
within subjects), race (Asian vs. British), and experiment (salient vs. non salient) as between 
subjects were performed. For emotion task, there was a significant interaction between trial 
and race F (1, 60) =8.19, MSE= 61556.81, p< 0.01, ηp2=0.12, Asians showed smaller switch 
cost than the British [t (31) =2.22, p< 0.05, M= 292 vs. 362 ms respectively]. Asians were 
faster on switch trials than the British participants [t (31) =5.0, p< 0.001, M= 947 vs. 1126 
ms respectively]. Again, on the repeat trials Asians performed faster than the British 
participants [t (31) =2.88, p< 0.01, M= 672 vs. 763 ms respectively]. For gender task, there 
was a significant higher order interaction between trial, race, and experiment F (1, 60) =4.88, 
MSE= 36013.85, p< 0.05, ηp2=0.7. For experiment 1 (high saliency emotion), the interaction 
between race and trial was significant F (1, 30) =5.41, MSE= 44255.28, p< 0.05, ηp2=0.15, 
Asians showed smaller switch cost than the British [t (15) =2.20, p< 0.05, M= 190 vs. 287 
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ms respectively]. In contrast, for experiment 2 (low saliency emotion), the interaction 
between race and trial failed to reach significance level F (1, 30) =0.51, MSE= 3365.20, p< 
0.47, ηp2=0.1.   
 
Fig. 4.3a. Mean reaction times of Asian and British participants on the switch and repeat trials in experiment 1 
(high saliency emotion). Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
 
Fig. 4.3b. Mean reaction times of Asian and British participants on the switch and repeat trials in experiment 2 
(low saliency emotion). Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
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Fig. 4.4a. Mean reaction times of Asian and British participants in the emotion and gender task in experiment 1 
(high saliency emotion). Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
 
Fig. 4.4b..Mean reaction times of Asian and British participants in the emotion and gender task in experiment 2 
(low saliency emotion). Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
The error rate was low and there was no evidence of speed-accuracy trade-off. The results 
are presented in table 4.1. 
 
 
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
Asian British
M
e
an
 r
e
ac
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
s 
(m
s)
 
Experiment 1 
High saliency emotion 
Emotion
Gender
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
Asian British
M
e
an
 r
e
ac
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
s 
(m
s)
 
Experiment 2 
Low saliency emotion 
Emotion
Gender
99 
 
Table 4.1 
Error rate (%) and standard deviation (SD) for the switch and repeat trials in experiment 
1 (high saliency emotion) and 2 (low saliency emotion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3. Discussion 
I have reported two experiments examining the effect of emotional salience and face 
classification task switching for Western and South-Asian-Pakistani participants. There were 
several important results – most notably there was a difference in responding on the emotion 
and gender decision tasks for White British and South Asian participants. White British 
participants showed faster RTs in the gender than the emotion task. In contrast, South Asian 
participants were faster to respond to emotion than to gender. These results broadly held 
across variations in the saliency of the emotional cue in the face, and they held across 
different task switching conditions.  
 
 
      
 Emotion 
Switch 
 
Repeat 
 Gender 
Switch 
 
Repeat 
 
 
Race % (SD) % (SD)  % (SD) % (SD)  
 
 
Experiment 1 
      
       
Asians 5.00 (.02) 2.15 (.03)  5.11 (.05) 4.00 (.05) 
 
 
British 
 
Experiment 2 
2.10 (.02) 3.00 (.03)  5.00 (.04) 4.20 (.05)  
 
Asians 
 
2.12 (.02) 
 
4.00 (.02) 
  
5.12 (.05) 
 
4. 25(.02) 
 
 
British 
 
5.00 (.05) 
 
3.15 (.03) 
  
5.00 (.05) 
 
5.00 (.04) 
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One account of these results is that Western individuals place high attentional weight 
on gender, and so are faster at gender classification relative to emotion judgments. The 
South Asian participants were slow at gender classification. This result does not fit with the 
idea that South Asian participants put a high weight on facial gender, since we might then 
expect gender classification to be faster and difficult to disengage from a task. In contrast it 
appears that some Asian participants may tend to be biased against gender classification 
making them slow to make gender classification responses on both switch and non-switch 
trials. That is, the effect may best be conceptualized as the South Asian participants setting a 
high threshold for gender classification. One reason for this might be that Asians rely more 
on contextual information when making face classification responses, due to a general bias 
in using contextual cues (see the Introduction). This dependence on context may be 
particularly strong for gender classification if Muslim participants (as tested here) strongly 
weight external signs when making gender classifications (e.g., taking into account the style 
of clothing). The absence of these external cues here might disrupt the ability of such 
participants to make gender classification responses to faces. This should be tested in further 
studies when responses to individuals wearing their usual dress. Another reason is the 
differential proportion of male and female participants in the present sample with the data 
over represented male subjects (62.5%) in the Asian group in contrast with same percentage 
of female participants among the British group. Future research is to assess not only cultural 
differences in emotion and gender classification but also gender differences. 
White British and South Asian/Pakistani participants also differed in that the British 
participants were slower on switch trials and showed larger switch cost than the Asian 
participants, however, there was no difference on repeat trials between these subject groups. 
This result suggest that none of the participant groups were more driven by bottom-up 
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repetition of the features of the task rather this result fits with a recent finding that 
bilingualism increases attentional capacity (Hernandez, Costa, & Humphreys, 2011), which 
may facilitate task switching. Note that the South Asian/Pakistani participants might have 
benefitted from being bilinguals. 
Alongside the differences between the two racial/cultural groups there were overall 
differences between the task switching effects in the emotion and gender tasks, with the 
switching effect greater for emotion decisions. This was not due to a delay on switching 
trials, however, but rather to the speeding of emotion responses on repeat trials. I propose 
that this result reflects priming of an emotion response system, which leads to faster emotion 
responding when emotion judgments are repeated across trials. There is considerable 
physiological and neuropsychological evidence that facial emotion can be processed 
independently of other forms of information about the face (including facial identity and 
gender, for example, patients following brain injury can discriminate emotion but not face 
identity or gender; see e.g., Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993; Parry, Young, Saul, & 
Moss, 1991; Young et al., 1993) and there is evidence for amygdala activation by emotional 
expressions of faces from neurophysiological and functional brain imaging studies 
(Vuillemier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003; George et al., 1993; Sergent, Ohta, 
MacDonald, & Zuck, 1994; Hasselmo, Rolls, & Baylis, 1989; see Haxby, Hoffman, & 
Gobbini, 2000, for a review). This suggests that emotional information may be processed 
through specialised sub-cortical routes through the amygdala, by-passing the cortical 
processes involved in identity and gender coding. It may be that this specialized neural 
system for processing emotions can be primed across trials. In contrast, gender decisions 
may require more detailed structural processing not involving a specialised ‘module’. As a 
consequence, it may be less easy to selectively prime gender decisions across trials. 
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However, in other studies I found a contrasting pattern of switching effect - either with no 
asymmetry of switch cost between emotion and gender (chapter 3) or larger switch cost for 
gender than emotion (chapter 5). One prior experiment has been conducted explicitly 
comparing two of the tasks used here, gender and emotion classification to faces. Reimers 
and Maylor (2005) found that the emotion classification was performed faster than the 
gender classification under baseline conditions and the switch costs were larger for emotion 
than the gender classification. 
4.3. General Discussion 
In this study, I examined the relative ease of switching between emotion and gender 
decision tasks in participants with contrasting racial/cultural groups. Three main results are 
apparent. First, Asian participants were faster in making decisions to emotions than the 
gender of face. This advantage was present regardless whether the task required decisions to 
salient (pronounced smile) or less salient emotions. Second, White British participants were 
slower than Asian participants on switch trials. Third, the switch cost for the emotion task 
was larger than the gender task.  
4.3.1. Cultural differences in face categorization 
Substantial research has documented performance differences when people from 
contrasting cultures are asked to categorize emotions of the faces (see e.g., Matsumoto & 
Ekman, 1989; Matsumoto, 1992; Biehl et al., 1997) - One common notion is that cultures 
differ in display rules of emotions imposed by the societies (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; 
Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) - for example, East Asian societies are well-known for the norm to 
inhibit emotion expression. Alongside this, cultural groups differ in the visual cues used to 
categorize face gender. In Asian (and particularly Muslim culture), the norm is to conceal 
female face and gender is usually signaled by a dress code whereas in Western culture 
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female faces are categorized by different external cues (e.g., make- up). The results showed 
that White British participants were quicker in responding to gender than emotion, in 
contrast South Asian participants were faster to respond to emotion than to gender. This 
advantage may reflect differential attentional weight given to these face dimensions in 
Western and Asian cultures. Note though that the differences were found with data averaged 
across White and Asian faces, so the results do not reflect own-race differences in face 
processing rather reflect cultural differences. Face processing is known to be highly 
configural among Asians compared to Westerner participants (Miyamoto, Yoshikawa, & 
Kitayama, 2011). The absence of external cues (i.e., head scarf/ clothing style) here might 
have slowed the gender categorization among the Asian subjects. 
Another aspect of this study was to explore switching effects in people from 
contrasting cultures. Given that there is differential attentional weight to contrasting 
dimensions of faces in different cultures, I expected performance differences between 
cultural groups. The results showed that White British participants were slower than Asians 
on switch trials, however there was no difference between the cultural groups on repeat 
trials. In addition, there was a larger switch cost for the British than the Asian participants. 
These results make clear that neither of these cultural groups is driven by bottom-up 
repetition of the features of the tasks rather suggest a difference in attentional control on the 
trials when the task changes. Note that the South Asian/Pakistani participants might have 
benefitted from being bilinguals. This result fits with the finding that bilingualism increases 
attentional capacity (Hernandez, Costa, & Humphreys, 2011), which may facilitate task 
switching.  
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4.3.2. Switching effects for face categorization  
There is much evidence from neuropsychological studies suggest that emotion and gender 
categorizations rely on contrasting processes (e.g., Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993; 
Parry, Young, Saul, & Moss, 1991). For example, emotion categorization involves the 
occipital to superior temporal stream with an involvement of the amygdala, while gender 
categorizations engage occipital to inferotemporal stream with active involvement of 
anterior temporal regions (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). The results here showed 
greater switch costs for the emotion than the gender decision task, but primarily due to faster 
responding when the emotion task was repeated. This result may reflect priming of an 
emotion response system, which leads to faster emotion responding when emotion 
judgments are repeated across trials. In contrast, gender responding may be less moderated 
by priming suggesting no hard-wired gender response system. Happy emotions are 
associated with human survival and well-being (e.g., Gottshalk, 1995; Fredrickson, 2000) 
and they can be capable of sustaining activation even without rehearsal (Anderson, 1983). 
Happy emotions also have an intrinsic motivation function which serves as a source of 
perceptual readiness (Bruner, 1957), I suggest that emotional facial attributes are more 
motivational and hence facilitate performance in an emotion-classification task compared 
with other tasks performed on faces (e.g., gender classification). Also the activation of a 
strong motivational goal can inhibit the accessibility of other goals, slowing switching 
responses (see Foster, Liberman, and Higgins, 2005). 
4.3.3. Conclusion 
I conclude that the difference in speed of emotion and gender classification between 
British and Asian subject groups reflect differential attentional weight placed on these face 
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dimensions in Western and Asian cultures. However, faster speed of switching in Asians 
relative to British subjects may be related to bilingualism. In addition, asymmetric switch 
costs between emotion and gender categorizations of faces represent priming of a response 
system related to emotion only. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT TASK SWITCHING BETWEEN FACIAL 
ATTRIBUTES 
Abstract 
In chapter 5, I adopt a different task switching procedure to experiments 1-3, where face 
processing tasks are switched across consecutive pairs of trials, and, alongside this, there are 
changes to irrelevant aspects of the faces (e.g., whether the same emotion is maintained 
when gender and occupation decisions are made). The results demonstrate disruptive effects 
of changing the facial emotion of gender on other face decisions, but not of changing the 
occupation of the person. The data are consistent with the implicit processing of facial 
emotion and gender but not of higher-order semantic aspects of faces (the person’s 
occupation) unless those aspects are task-relevant. 
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An observer perceives several attributes while looking at a face – its gender, the emotion 
being conveyed, perhaps the trustworthiness of the person or their identity. Some of these 
attributes may be extracted explicitly according to the demands of a particular task (e.g., 
retrieving information about the occupation of an individual), whilst others may be extracted 
implicitly, even when irrelevant to the task at hand. Whether our ability to compute these 
different attributes depends on the same or different processes is a question that has been of 
considerable interest for cognitive science. The present study aimed to examine this issue by 
assessing the ability of participants to switch from one attribute to another as they explicitly 
performed particular face processing tasks, and also by assessing effects of switching an 
irrelevant face attribute across trials as people perform tasks. Task switching may be easier 
to the extent that task share common processes (Schneider & Logan, 2010). There may also 
be some variables that exert an effect on switching even when they are irrelevant to the task, 
but which may or may not switch across trials. Here I examined whether changing or 
maintaining the emotional state of a face across trials affected the ability to switch between 
judgments of gender and occupation, made to faces. If emotion is extracted implicitly, then 
switches in emotion across trials may affect performance – for example, it may be disruptive 
when the primary task (e.g., gender discrimination) is maintained across trials and beneficial 
if the change in the emotional state of the face coincides with a change in the primary 
attribute driving performance (e.g., from gender to occupation).  
5.1. Functional independence of facial attributes 
Bruce and Young (1986) presented an influential cognitive model of face processing based 
on the assumption that face processing involved several functionally independent processing 
modules. The model assumed that identification of a familiar face involves the formation of 
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a view independent structural description, which could be compared with all known faces 
stored in Face Recognition Units (FRUs), followed by identification of particular person and 
retrieval of semantic information, after which there is activation of the phonological codes 
underlying the person’s name.  
Alongside the processes that lead to face identification and the retrieval of semantic 
and name information, Bruce and Young posited the operation of other processes that extract 
(e.g.) facial emotion. Hence the model suggests that face recognition (e.g., judged by access 
to semantic information about a person) is distinct from processing facial emotion. Quite 
how facial gender is computed is less clear – it could be retrieved by recognizing the person, 
or it could be computed from the structural properties of the faces.  
5.2. Asymmetric interference between facial features 
Studies have employed speeded judgments to different dimensions of faces and 
shown that interference can arise when there is variation in some irrelevant attributes (so-
called ‘Garner interference’). For example, Atkinson, Tipples, Burt and Young (2005, 
Experiment 1) demonstrated that gender did interfere with the emotion judgments to a face 
(happy vs. fearful), but the reverse pattern of interference did not occur (when the task was 
gender classification (male vs. female). The same results were found using morphed faces in 
a speeded classification task (Schweinberger, Burton, & Kelly, 1999). These asymmetries 
between the processing of facial attributes indicate that observers, generally, are capable of 
responding to some aspects of  a face (such as its gender) while ignoring the emotion of that 
face, but emotion processing can be interfered with by variation in other facial attributes 
(Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998).  
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Another way to examine the relations between the processing of different facial 
attributes is to evaluate the effects of switching from one task to another – if tasks use 
overlapping processes, then the effects of task switching may be reduced. In addition, the 
implicit processing of face attributes can be assessed by measuring effects of changing this 
attribute on performance of the (other) explicit tasks. If the attribute is processed implicitly, 
then it may affect performance on the explicit tasks when the implicit attribute changes 
(especially if the change in the implicit attribute coincides with the main task being 
maintained or changing). Here I used this approach to examine the relations between 
processing the gender, occupation and emotion of faces. Unlike the experiments reported in 
chapters 2-4, the design of Rogers and Monsell (1995) was used, where tasks switched 
across pairs of trials rather than trial blocks. This enabled the implicit property to be changed 
or maintained in a dynamic fashion, coinciding with or contradicting the maintenance or 
change in the main, explicit task.  Participants were asked to make gender and occupation 
decisions (experiment 1), gender and emotion decisions (experiment 2) and occupation and 
emotion decisions (experiment 3) to faces and the effect of switching from one explicit task 
to another was measured. In addition, the other attribute (emotion in experiment 1; 
occupation in experiment 2 and gender in experiment 3) was varied. Are there differences in 
task switching between different explicit tasks (across the experiments), and are there effects 
of switching or maintaining the implicit property? I report effects of changing facial emotion 
and gender as an implicit manipulation but not effects of changing occupation. 
 
 
 
110 
 
5.3. Experiment 1: gender and occupation decisions (implicit change in emotion) 
5.3.1. Method 
Participants 
Sixteen postgraduate students from the University of Birmingham (9 female and 7 male, 
ages 21-25 years, mean 23.25 years) with normal colour vision, volunteered for the study in 
response to an advertisement. None had reported any injury, disease or eye surgery.  
Materials and displays 
Gender-occupation task stimuli. The stimuli were 16 faces in colour bitmap images 
(standardized to 300 × 300 pixels & matched subjectively for luminance and contrast) of 8 
famous singers and actors which depicted happy and neutral facial emotional expression. 
Half of the images were of women. The 8 photos of singers comprised Robbie Williams, 
Paul McCartney, Britney Spears, Madonna, while 8 photos of actors included Daniel 
Radcliffe, Rowan Atkinson, Kate Winslet, and Elizabeth Taylor. These stimuli were 
embedded in Rogers and Monsell’s (1995) alternating-run task switching paradigm. Pilot 
testing ensured that the famous faces were recognizable by the sample population, and 
efforts were made to equate the famous faces in terms of stimulus quality (e.g., resolution) as 
well as face angle, race (white), emotional expression (positive & neutral), and 
attractiveness. Half of the pictures portrayed happy expression (smiling-obvious teeth). The 
experiment was designed in E-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002, 
version 1.2). The faces were presented in the lower right/left quadrants as a cue for the 
occupation task while presented in upper right/left quadrants as a cue for the gender task. For 
half of the participants, the experiment started with the presentation of the gender task. For 
the other half, the occupation task was presented first. While half the faces were happy the 
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other half were presented with a neutral expression, so the emotion could change when the 
main task stayed the same or changed– creating a 2 (emotion switch or repeat) x 2 (main task 
switch or repeat) design. Each trial consisted of a fixation (+) displayed for 1000 ms, 
followed by a blank white screen, then the face appeared in upper/lower quadrants with a 
fixation cross (+) in the center of the screen. A manual response was made to the face. The 
stimuli were presented on a 14 inch laptop and remained on the screen until the response was 
made. Participants were presented with 241 trials experimental trials.  
Procedure 
The study received approval by University of Birmingham Ethic Research Committee. Upon 
arrival participants were given an informed consent form to review and sign. Upon consent, 
they were given a description of the procedure. Next, s/he was seated before the laptop at a 
comfortable viewing distance (approximately 60 cm). Participants were told that this was a 
reaction time experiment, and that they must respond by pressing the fixed keys on keyboard 
as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy. The stimuli and the tasks were then 
explained (gender-occupation). On each trial, participants were presented with a face and 
they were required to judge gender (male/female) or occupation (actor/singer) of the face in 
241 experimental trials of the gender and occupation task. Following the experiment, the 
results were saved and participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
5.3.2. Results 
RTs for the first trial were discarded because no task switch took place, then outliers were 
removed and response times (RTs) were excluded above 2.5 standard deviations from each 
participants’ mean. Responses longer than 3,000 ms or shorter than 100 ms were omitted. 
The data are reported in two sections. First, the effect of explicit task switching was assessed 
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with the data for the gender and occupation tasks. Second, the effect of implicit emotion 
switch was examined with the data averaged across gender and the occupation tasks on the 
switch and repeat trials.  
(a). Explicit task switching 
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task 
switch (switch vs. repeat) x task (gender judgment vs. occupation judgment) as within 
subject factors. The main effect of task switch was significant F (1, 15) =33.00, p<0.001, 
MSE=13881.18, ηp2=.68. RTs were slower on switch (M=961.94 ms) than repeat 
(M=792.72 ms) trials. There was a reliable main effect of task F (1, 15) =92.80, p<0.001, 
MSE=1385.76, ηp2=.86. The RTs were faster on the gender than the occupation task 
(M=832.50 vs. 922.16 ms respectively). There was a significant interaction between task 
switch and task F (1, 15) =10.04, p<0.01, MSE=1178.68, ηp2=.40 (fig. 5.1). Pair wise 
comparisons revealed a significant difference in switch costs (switch – repeat trials) between 
the gender and occupation tasks t (15) = 3.16, p<0.01. The switch cost was larger for the 
occupation than for the gender task. 
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Fig.5.1. Mean reaction times (ms) on the switch and repeat trials for the gender and occupation task. Error bars 
correspond to the average standard error.  
  
(b). Effect of implicit emotion 
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task 
switch (switch vs. repeat) x emotion switch (emotion switch vs. emotion repeat) as within 
subject factors. The main effect of task switch was significant F (1, 15) =28.34, p<0.001, 
MSE=13433.04, ηp2=.65. RTs were slower on switch (M=954.41 ms) than repeat 
(M=800.15 ms) trials. The main effect of emotion switch was significant F (1, 15) =42.51, 
p<0.001, MSE=4506.93, ηp2=.73. RTs were slower on emotion switch (M=931.99 ms) than 
repeat (M=822.57 ms) trials. There was significant interaction between emotion switch and 
task switch F (1, 15) =13.84, p<0.001, MSE=1006.10, ηp2=.48 (fig.5.2). This was 
decomposed by analyzing the data separated for emotion switch and emotion repeat trials, 
for the task switch and task repeat conditions. For the task switch condition, there was a 
significant effect of emotion switch F (1, 15) =46.73, p<0.001, MSE=3304.14, ηp2=.75. RTs 
on emotion switch trials were slower than emotion repeat trials t (15) = 6.83, p<0.001. For 
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the task repeat condition, there was also significant effect of emotion F (1, 15) =23.13, 
p<0.001, MSE=2208.89, ηp2=.60. RTs on emotion switch trials were slower than emotion 
repeat trials t (15) = 4.81, p<0.001. The interaction arose because the effect of switching the 
emotion of the face was larger on trials where there was a switch in the explicit task than on 
trials here the explicit task remained the same (see fig. 5.2). 
 
Fig.5.2a. Mean reaction times (ms) for the emotion switch and emotion repeat trials in the task switch 
condition. Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
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Fig.5.2b. Mean reaction times (ms) for the emotion switch and emotion repeat trials in the task repeat 
condition. Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
The error rate was low and there was no evidence of speed-accuracy trade-off. The results 
are presented in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1a 
Mean error rate (standard deviation) for the explicit task switch in the gender and 
occupation task   
              Gender     Occupation  
Switch Repeat Switch Repeat 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
2 (.02) 
 
1 (.02) 
 
2 (.02) 
 
2 (.01) 
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Table 5.1b 
Mean error rate (standard deviation) for the effect of implicit emotion switch in the gender 
and occupation task   
Emotion Switch Emotion Repeat 
M (SD) M (SD) 
 
2 (.02) 
 
1.5 (.01) 
 
5.3.3. Discussion 
The study showed that the occupation decision task showed larger effects of task switching 
than the gender decision task. The same result was found in an earlier study with occupation 
and gender blocked presentation (chapter 3 - experiment 3). This asymmetrical task 
switching effect cannot be attributed to selective inhibition of the easier task here, to enable 
switching to take place (see Allport & Wylie, 1999, for experiments on task switching with 
Stroop stimuli). An alternative account is that it was less easy for participants to disengage 
attention from the gender than the occupation task, and this slowed switches to occupation 
decisions. 
 In addition to this, the experiment showed clear effects of repeating or switching the 
emotional state of the faces. RTs were faster if facial emotion stayed the same than if it 
changed. Interestingly, this effect of changing the emotional state was larger on switch than 
repeat trials in the explicit task. It may be that, when the explicit task switches, participants 
are distracted from the explicit switch by the change in the (implicit) emotional state of the 
face, and this slows performance on the explicit switch trial. Whatever the case, the data 
indicate that facial emotion was processed, even though it was irrelevant to the main tasks. 
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5.4. Experiment 2: gender and emotion decisions (implicit change in occupation) 
 
5.4.1. Method 
 
Participants 
Sixteen postgraduate students from University of Birmingham (10 female and 6 male, ages 
20-25 years, mean 22.81 years) with normal colour vision, volunteered for the study in 
response to the advertisement. None had reported any injury, disease or eye surgery. 
Materials and displays 
Emotion-gender task stimuli. The stimuli and displays were same as in experiment 1 except 
that the faces were presented in the lower right/left quadrants as a cue for the emotion task 
while they were presented in the upper right/left quadrants as a cue for the gender task. For 
half of the participants, the experiment started with the presentation of emotion task. This 
was counterbalanced across participants. The occupation of the individuals could be repeated 
or switched across trials, and this created a 2 x 2 design where the explicit tasks either 
repeated or switched while there was either a repeat or switch of the implicit task 
(occupation). 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in experiment 1 except that the stimuli and the tasks were 
explained as emotion-gender. On each trial, participants were presented with a face and they 
were required to judge the emotion (happy/neutral) or gender (male/female) of the face in 
241 experimental trials of the emotion and gender task. Following the experiment, the results 
were saved and participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
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5.4.2. Results 
As for the experiment 1, the data are reported in two sections. First, the effect of explicit task 
switching was assessed with the data for the emotion and gender tasks (relevant features) on 
the switch and repeat trials separately. Second, the effect of implicit occupation switches on 
the task switch and task repeat conditions was examined with the data averaged across the 
emotion and the gender tasks. 
RTs for the first trial were discarded because no task switch took place for the first 
trial, then outliers were removed and response times (RTs) were excluded above 2.5 standard 
deviations from each participants’ mean. Responses longer than 3,000 ms or shorter than 100 
ms were omitted. 
(a). Explicit task switching 
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task 
switch (switch vs. repeat) x task (emotion judgment vs. gender judgment) as within subject 
factors. The main effect of task switch was significant F (1, 15) =153.05, p<0.001, 
MSE=17105.91, ηp2=.91. RTs were slower on switch (M=1179.12 ms) than repeat 
(M=774.60 ms) trials. There was a reliable main effect of the task F (1, 15) =73.11, p<0.001, 
MSE=3868.73, ηp2=.83. RTs were faster on the emotion than the gender task (M=910.37 vs. 
1043.34 ms respectively). There was a significant interaction between task switch and task F 
(1, 15) =49.81, p<0.001, MSE=2967.78, ηp2=.76. Pair wise comparison on the switch cost 
(switch minus repeat trials) between the emotion and the gender task was significant t (15) 
=7.05, p<.001. The switch cost for the gender task was larger than for the emotion task 
(fig.5.3). 
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Fig. 5.3. Mean reaction times (ms) on Switch and repeat trials for the emotion and gender task. Error bars 
correspond to the average standard error.  
 
(b). Effect of implicit occupation switch 
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task 
switch (switch vs. repeat) x occupation switch (occupation switch vs. occupation repeat) as 
within subject factors. The main effect of task switch was significant F (1, 15) =140.59, 
p<0.001, MSE=17980.83, ηp2=.90. RTs were slower on switch (M=1179.12 ms) than repeat 
(M=774.60 ms) trials. There was no effect of occupation switch F <1. The interaction 
between task switch and occupation switch was significant F (1, 15) =4.71, p<0.05, 
MSE=629.31, ηp2=.23 (fig.5.4). There was a small cross over result in which responses on 
explicit task switch trials were slower when the occupation of the faces changed than when 
they stayed the same, while when the explicit task repeated, RTs tended to be faster when 
the occupations of the faces switched (see fig. 5.4). However the effects of switching the 
occupations of the faces were not reliable, either for trials where the explicit task stayed the 
same and when it switched (t <2).  
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Fig. 5.4. Mean reaction times (ms) on the task switch and task repeat trials for the occupation switch and 
occupation repeat trials. Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
The error rate was low and there was no evidence of speed-accuracy trade-off. The results 
are presented in table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2a 
Mean error rate (standard deviation) for the explicit task switch in the emotion and gender 
task   
              Emotion  Gender  
Switch Repeat Switch Repeat 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
3 (.02) 
 
2 (.02) 
 
2 (.02) 
 
3 (.01) 
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Table 5.2b 
Mean error rate (standard deviation) for the effect of implicit occupation switch in the 
emotion and gender task 
Occupation Switch Occupation Repeat 
M (SD) M (SD) 
 
2.5 (.02) 
 
2.5 (.01) 
 
5.4.3. Discussion 
As in experiment 1, there were again asymmetrical effects of task switching in the primary 
(explicit tasks), with task switch effects now being larger on the gender than the emotion 
decision tasks. Indeed the effects of task switching on the gender task were reliably greater 
here than in experiment 1 (t (30) =6.90, p<.001). Again this result does not reflect inhibition 
of the easier task, since the emotion decisions were faster than the gender decisions on repeat 
trials. Rather the results can be attributed to the difficulty in switching attention from face 
emotion to compute gender, slowing gender decisions on switch trials.  
In contrast to experiment 1, there were very weak effects of switching another aspect 
of the faces – the occupations performed by the actors. There was no main effect of implicit 
task switch, and though there was a borderline interaction between implicit and explicit task 
switching, the differences between repeat and switch occupation trials were not reliable for 
either the repeat or the switch trials in the explicit task. The data suggest only weak 
computation of an individual’s occupation when this is not the explicit task that must be 
performed. 
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5.5. Experiment 3: occupation and emotion decisions (implicit change in gender) 
5.5.1. Method 
 
Participants 
Sixteen postgraduate students from University of Birmingham (6 female and 10 male, ages 
21-25 years, mean 22.62 years) with normal colour vision, volunteered for the study in 
response to the advertisement. None had reported any injury, disease or eye surgery. 
Materials and displays 
Emotion-Occupation Task stimuli. The stimuli and displays were same as in experiment 1, 
except that the faces were presented in lower right/left quadrants as a cue for the emotion 
task while presented in upper right/left quadrants as a cue for the occupation task. For half of 
the participants, experiment started with the presentation of the emotion task. This was 
counterbalanced across participants, as the other half of participants performed occupation 
task first.  
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in experiment 1, except that the stimuli and the tasks were 
explained as emotion and occupation decisions. On each trial, participants were presented 
with a face and they were required to judge the emotion (happy/neutral) or occupation 
(singer/actor) of the face in 241 experimental trials of the emotion and occupation task. 
Following the experiment, the results were saved and participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
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5.5.2. Results 
As for experiment 1, the data are reported in three sections. First, the effect of explicit task 
switching was assessed with the data for the emotion and occupation tasks (relevant features 
of the task) on switch and repeat trials separately. Second, the effect of an implicit gender 
switch was examined with the data averaged across the emotion and occupation task on 
switch and repeat trials. RTs for the first trial were discarded because no task switch took 
place for the first trial, then outliers were removed and response times (RTs) were excluded 
above 2.5 standard deviations from each participant’s mean. Responses longer than 3,000 ms 
or shorter than 100 ms were omitted. 
(a). Explicit task switching 
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task 
switch (switch vs. repeat) x task (emotion judgment vs. occupation judgment) as within 
subject factors. The main effect of task switch was significant F (1, 15) =204.06, p<0.001, 
MSE=6515.87, ηp2=.93. RTs were slower on switch (M=1275.37 ms) than repeat 
(M=967.42 ms) trials. There was a reliable main effect of task F (1, 15) =151.29, p<0.001, 
MSE=4439.44, ηp2=.91. RTs for the emotion task were faster than for the occupation task 
(1008.80 vs. 1205.69 ms, respectively). There was a significant interaction between task 
switch and task (1, 15) =37.85, p<0.001, MSE=4381.40, ηp2=.71 (fig.5.5). The task switch 
cost (switch minus repeat) was larger for the occupation than the emotion task t (15) =6.15, 
p<0.001.  
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Fig. 5.5. Mean reaction times (ms) on the task switch and task repeat trials for the emotion and occupation task. 
Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
(b). Effect of implicit gender  
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task 
switch (switch vs. repeat) x gender switch (gender switch vs. gender repeat) as within 
subject factors. The main effect of task switch was significant F (1, 15) =419.31, p<0.001, 
MSE=3618.39, ηp2=.96. RTs were slower on switch (M=1275.37 ms) than repeat 
(M=967.42 ms) trials. There was significant main effect of gender switch F (1, 15) =64.04, 
p<0.001, MSE=4143.26, ηp2=.81. RTs on gender switch trials were slower compared to 
gender repeat trials (1185.79 vs. 1057.01 ms, respectively). There was no interaction 
between task switch and gender switch F<3 (fig. 5.6). 
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Fig.5.6. Mean reaction times (ms) on the task switch and task repeat trials for the gender switch and gender 
repeat trials. Error bars correspond to the average standard error.  
The error rate was low and there was no evidence of speed-accuracy trade-off. The results 
are presented in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3a 
Mean error rate (standard deviation) for the explicit task switch in the emotion and 
occupation task   
              Emotion  Occupation  
Switch Repeat Switch Repeat 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
2 (.02) 
 
1 (.02) 
 
2 (.02) 
 
3 (.01) 
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Table 5.3b 
Mean error rate (standard deviation) for the effect of implicit gender switch in the emotion 
and occupation task 
Gender Switch Gender Repeat 
M (SD) M (SD) 
 
2 (.02) 
 
2 (.01) 
 
5.5.3. Discussion 
The effects of switching explicit tasks mirrored those found in experiment 2. There was an 
asymmetry in switch costs with the effects on occupation decisions being larger than those 
on emotion decisions. As emotion decisions were also faster than occupation decisions on 
repeat trials, the data cannot be attributed to inhibition of the easier task when switch costs 
would be larger on emotion decisions). However the results fit with the argument that facial 
emotion is difficult to disengage from, and hence switch costs are increased to the non-
emotion task. Indeed, as for the effects of switching to the ender task in experiment 2, there 
were increased effects of task switching on occupation decisions (t (30) =5.30, p<0.001) here 
relative to experiment 1 (when occupation decisions were paired with gender decisions). It 
should be noted here that switch costs changed as a function of the other explicit task it was 
paired with (i.e., larger when paired with gender decisions (t (30) =2.93, p<0.01) than when 
the emotion decisions were paired with occupation decisions. 
Unlike the changes in the occupations of the faces, which had minimal effect when 
occupation decision was not the main task, changing the gender of the faces did affect 
performance here. RTs were slowed when faces changed gender than when the gender 
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stayed the same, even though the gender of the individuals was irrelevant to the task. The 
data indicate that there is implicit processing of the gender of the faces. It is interesting that 
this evidence for implicit processing of facial gender occurred here even though famous 
faces were used. Quinn, Mason, and Macrae (2009) reported that the gender of famous 
individuals was not automatically coded. These data contradict this assertion and suggest 
that implicit task switching effects may provide a particularly sensitive way to measure 
whether facial attributes are processed.  
5.6. General discussion 
This study provides clues from task switching for an asymmetric relationship between the 
processes underlying judgments of facial attributes. In experiment 1, gender was faster than 
the occupation task but the occupation task yielded larger switch costs. In experiment 2 
emotion decisions were faster than gender decisions, but the gender task produced larger 
switch cost than the emotion task. In experiment 3, the emotion task, again was faster than 
the occupation task but the occupation task showed larger switch costs. These results counter 
the argument that asymmetric switch costs necessarily emerge because participants must 
inhibit the easier of two tasks to enable the harder task to be conducted. It is interesting that 
this result occurred here despite that fact that the stimuli (faces) were the same in all the 
tasks, and so the same stimulus could have cued the more automatic process, and this might 
need to be inhibited to enable performance to be effected. The failure to find larger switch 
costs on the easier tasks (gender in experiment 1 and emotion in experiments 2 and 3)  
suggests instead that the asymmetric switch costs may reflect the ease of disengaging 
attention from a more salient property of the stimulus (facial emotion or gender) compared 
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with a less salient property (occupation). If participants maintained attention on the more 
salient property, then large switch costs would emerge on the other task. 
The switch effects in earlier chapters with blocked presentations are not same as 
those reported here in terms of the relative magnitudes of the effects across tasks. Has this 
something to do with blocked switch tasks (chapters 2-4) being sensitive to other factors? 
For example, in chapter 4, emotion decisions showed larger switch costs than gender 
decisions, but this was due to fast responding to emotion on repeat trials – suggesting that 
there was priming of emotion responding and this may be especially influential when I had 
blocked presentations and priming builds up across trials. Maybe priming plays a reduced 
role when there are more rapid switches across trials, when the ease of disengaging attention 
from one attribute becomes important – in which case emotion decisions show a smaller 
switch cost, as I found here. 
As well as requiring participants to make explicit switches from one task to another, I also 
examined the effects of making an implicit switch, when an irrelevant attribute of the 
stimulus changed across trials (emotion, occupation and gender, in experiments 1-3 
respectively). When emotion and gender changed, performance on the other tasks was 
affected. In experiment 1, changes in emotion affected both repeat and switch trials in the 
main tasks, with the effects on switching being stronger. To account for this, I suggest that 
participants found it difficult to select the appropriate aspects of the face to respond to – 
when both the emotional state of the face and the task changed. In experiment 3, effects of 
changing gender were also pronounced, but in this instance it affected performance equally 
in the repeat and switch trials of the main tasks. One reason why effects were less 
pronounced on switch trials in this case is that the switches involved facial emotion, which 
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might be a relatively strong cue either to switch tasks or to repeat the task, so that equal 
effects of changing facial gender occurred in both instances. In contrast to these effects, 
switching the occupation associated with the face had minimal effect of gender and emotion 
decisions. 
These results fit with the idea that facial emotion and gender are computed in a 
relatively automatic way, even when they are irrelevant to the main task. Hence changing the 
facial emotion or gender slowed performance, perhaps by distracting attention from the main 
task(s). In contrast to this, there was little evidence that the occupations of people are 
computed in other face processing tasks.  
Within accounts such as that of Bruce and Young (1986) these results can be 
accommodated if emotion and gender are computed by slave systems, separate from the face 
recognition system, with the slave systems operating automatically. In contrast, access to 
semantic information from faces (related to peoples’ occupations), depends on attention to 
the relevant aspects of the face. The data indicate that there is implicit processing of the 
gender of the faces. It is interesting that this evidence for implicit processing of facial gender 
occurred here even though famous faces were used. Quinn, Mason and Macrae (2009) 
reported that famous faces were not classified automatically for gender. The data here 
contradict this assertion and suggest that implicit task switching effects may provide a 
particularly sensitive way to measure whether facial attributes are processed.  
5.6.1. Conclusion 
I have provided evidence from a task switching paradigm that: 
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(i) there are asymmetrical effects of switching between different judgments with face 
stimuli, and in particular it was difficult to switch from emotion judgments to make 
gender and occupation judgments. This is consistent with facial emotion being 
difficult to disengage from. 
(ii) judgment of facial attributes can be significantly influenced by changes in the 
emotion and gender of faces even when emotion and gender are irrelevant to the task 
at hand.  These data indicate that emotion and gender are processed automatically. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter provides an integrative overview of the five main factors related to task 
switching which have been the focus of this thesis: (i) learning and switching, (ii) individual 
differences in switching, (iii) switch cost asymmetries, (iv) cultural factors and (ii) implicit 
processing of stimuli under conditions of task switching. The work provides answers to the 
following research questions: How does practice affect performance? What is the nature of 
individual differences and asymmetries in face categorization? Is it easier to switch attention 
to one facial feature rather than others? Does the ease of categorizing certain facial features 
vary across cultures?  How is switching may be modulated by implicit coding of stimuli?  
6.1. Learning and switching 
The data reported in chapter 2 indicate that practice generally reduced switch costs. This 
replicates prior findings (e.g., Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de 
Sather, 2001), however, I did not find any evidence of larger switch costs for word reading 
than for colour naming. This does not match with previous findings by Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh (1994). However, the experiments in chapter 2 used manual responses rather than a 
naming task. Standard asymmetrical Stroop interference effects are typically reduced under 
manual response conditions (e.g., Keele, 1972; Pritchatt, 1968), presumably because, unlike 
verbal responding, manual responding to words is not over learned when compared to 
manual responses to colours. 
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Most interestingly, Stroop congruency effects increased across trials under conditions 
where a small constant-set of incongruent colour-words were used. The effects emerged 
through increasing benefits to colour identification on congruent trials, while RTs on 
incongruent trials showed dual patterns: either they tended to increase or they remained 
constant. To account for these results, I suggest that there were two effects of practice on 
constant, incongruent colour words which traded-off against each other to reduce any overall 
changes on performance: there were overall beneficial effects of practice, pitted against 
increased interference as integrated colour-word representations developed (with a small set 
of words with constant colour-word relations). On the congruent trials, the word and colour 
carry no competition, therefore the congruence of stimulus properties makes a perceptual 
unit which is easy to retrieve from its’ stored presentation in the visual system-facilitating 
the responses even more with the practice. The increased congruency effects were most 
apparent on colour identification trials, consistent with it being more difficult to focus 
attention on colour and to ignore word identity when the colour and the word are strongly 
integrated. This pattern of results was not found when specific pairings of colours and words 
were not used and words and colours were randomly re-paired across trials, indicating that 
the effects reflecting the learning of specific word-colour bindings. 
The results in chapter 2 are consistent with prior evidence that Stroop interference is 
stronger for stimuli that form integrated representations, probably because integrated 
representations of stimuli makes it difficult to attend to the colour dimension relative to the 
word. Previously word-colour integration has been manipulated by varying the perceptual 
relations between the colour and the whole word (e.g., Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997). The 
current results add to this by showing that learning a specific word colour relation is also 
critical. This matches with prior findings that learning can modulate the binding between 
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stimulus attributes (e.g., Humphreys, Riddoch, & Fortt, 2006). The learning leads to 
facilitated responses to colours on congruent trials. On incongruent trials, I suggest that the 
potentially negative consequences of attending to a word strongly integrated with the colour 
was balanced by the benefits of overall practice. This meant that performance on 
incongruent trials did not vary across the blocks. It is also of interest that the results were 
strongest on colour identification relative to word identification, despite the fact that overall 
RT differences between the tasks were minimized by the use of manual responding. This 
indicates that there can remain a residual difference in the ease of attending to colour and to 
word identity, which is highlighted when the word and colour are strongly integrated. 
Attention to colour remains vulnerable to the effects of word identity even under manual 
response conditions. 
6.2. Individual differences in task switching 
Previous work (Salthouse et al., 1998) demonstrated that there are individual differences in 
the ability to switch between different tasks. In particular, the ease of switching from one 
task to another is modulated by intelligence (IQ) - faster ‘switchers’ have higher intelligence.  
In chapter 3, I examined individual differences in switching between facial features 
and the relations not only between task switching and IQ but also the relations between 
switching and EI. EI and IQ are not synonymous. Though EI is related to crystallized IQ (see 
e.g., Farrelly & Austin, 2007; MacCann et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2005) it is more 
specifically related to skills in emotion perception – so that people high in EI tend to be 
better at perceiving emotional expressions from faces than those low in EI  
In chapters 3, participants performed emotion, gender and occupation judgments and 
in chapter 4 participants performed emotion and gender judgments with a common set of 
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faces, with different pairings of tasks brought together in different experiments and 
participants required to switch between tasks after each block of 16 trials. Emotion 
classification responses were overall easier than the other tasks but there was no asymmetric 
switch costs when emotion was paired with the gender or occupation tasks in chapter 3, 
though the emotion task showed larger switch costs in chapter 4. Switching between tasks of 
unequal difficulty is often not symmetric and significant asymmetries have been observed in 
various tasks (e.g., Allport, Styles, Hsieh, 1994; Wang et al., 2007; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 
2005). Reimers & Maylor (2005) also reported asymmetries between emotion and gender 
classification tasks (i.e., larger switch costs for the emotion than the gender categorization 
task). The data reported by Reimers and Maylor are similar to those found in chapter 4 here. 
Reimers and Maylor did not separate out switch and repeat trials. In the present case, the 
larger switch costs for the emotion task arose because repeat trials became faster for the 
emotion task. It may be that emotion decisions can be primed across trials, enabling RTs to 
speed on repeat trials. It should be noted too that, in chapter 5, when switches took place 
after fewer sets of trials, switch costs were lower on emotion decisions than on gender and 
occupation classifications. In the latter case there would be less opportunity for emotion-
priming to build up, reducing the advantage for repeat emotion decisions, and performance 
may then be more sensitive to the ease of disengaging attention from the switching tasks – 
with emotion decisions being harder to disengage attention from.  
Over and above this, I found differential effects of EI and IQ on task switching 
performance. EI had a reliable inverse correlation with the switch costs when emotion 
classification was included, but not when switches were made between gender and 
occupation. This suggests that EI is not related to all aspects of task switching, but rather is 
more linked with emotion judgments. This finding fits with the idea that EI is positively 
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associated with skill at identifying emotional expressions among faces (Ciarrochi, Chan, & 
Bajgar, 2001) and it enables emotion judgments both to be engaged in more quickly and 
more rapidly disengaged from – thereby reducing switch costs. In addition, while all EI 
factors predicted task switching performance when emotion classification was involved, this 
effect was strongest for intrapersonal EQ, perhaps because emotion judgments particularly 
relate to this factor (Mayer & Geher, 2002). It is also interesting to note here the null effect 
of EI in predicting switch costs when emotion was an implicit feature of the task but gender 
and occupation judgments were made (note that, in this case, the emotions of the faces could 
vary across trials; see chapter 5 where this was examined more thoroughly). This suggests 
that EI is not related to the implicit recognition of emotion. 
In contrast to the null effect of EI when gender and occupation decisions were made, 
there was a reliable effect of IQ - participants with higher IQ were better able to switch 
between tasks than those with a lower IQ. This result is consistent with previous findings 
that people with higher IQ are faster ‘switchers’ (Salthouse et al., 1998) and that the 
measures of IQ inversely correlate with mixing costs when two different tasks are presented 
in a block of trials  (Yehene & Meiran, 2007).  
6.3. Switch cost asymmetries 
Previous work suggests that emotion is classified automatically (e.g., Driver & Vuilleumier, 
2001) while face gender is not, at least for famous faces (Quinn, Mason, & Macrae, 2009). 
The results here showed that overall, emotion decisions were easier than gender and 
occupation decisions (chapters 3-5), though the switch costs varied. Switch costs were either 
equal across the tasks (chapter 3), larger for emotion (chapter 4) or smaller for emotion 
(chapter 5). The results generally do not agree with the argument that there are necessarily 
asymmetries in switch costs when tasks of unequal difficulty are paired together switch (see 
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Allport, Styles, Hsieh, 1994; Wang et al., 2007; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005) rather suggest 
that different factors may affect switch costs according to whether tasks are presented in 
relatively long or short trial blocks. Notably, under long trial blocks it is possible for factors 
such as priming to build up, so that (e.g.,) repeat emotion decisions speed up. The net 
outcome might then be a large switch costs due to the relative speeding of repeat trials. With 
short trial blocks performance may be less affected by this and more by (e.g.,) the ease of 
disengaging attention from one task and applying it to the stimulus properties appropriate for 
the new task. Here it seems that emotion decisions are difficult to switch from, generating 
costs on switch trials for other tasks performed on the same faces (gender and occupation 
decisions here). Another account relates to the motivation-related constructs. For example, 
goals and other motivation functions could serve as a source of perceptual readiness (Bruner, 
1957) and are capable of sustaining activation even without rehearsal (Anderson, 1983). 
These factors in turn direct informational processing accordingly (Wyer & Srull, 1986, 
1989) - for example, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) asked their participants to rehearse a series of 
actions followed by either the performance of the actions (goal condition) or observation of 
the actions performed by another person (no-goal condition). Using a recognition test, 
participants responded faster and more accurate to the actions in the goal condition 
compared to the no-goal condition, when actually they did not rehearse the actions in the 
intervening time suggesting the persisting activation due to the formation of an intention. 
Foster, Liberman, and Higgins (2005) suggested that fulfillment of a goal inhibits the 
accessibility of goal-related constructs and is proportional to the strength of the motivation. I 
suggest that some of the facial attributes are rather more motivational which inhibits the 
accessibility of the other goal-related constructs, rather remain active in order to prepare the 
individual for transforming the intentional status into action. Emotion is encoded as a 
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commitment marker which is tagged to the representation of the activity and in turn serves as 
an internal context cue that biases the cognitive system (attentional/retrieval process) and 
build-up of performance than the other facial attributes (say gender/occupation).       
6.4. Cultural effects in categorization 
In chapter 4, I investigated the effects of race/culture on face classification and task 
switching. Asian participants showed overall smaller switch costs than British/white 
participants. This may be attributed to various factors. British participants may be more 
driven by bottom-up repetition of stimulus features, which might delay task switching; Asian 
participants may be more top-down driven and better able to implement executive control 
over the tasks.  This argument fits with an earlier finding suggesting that bilinguals are better 
at top-down management of competing task sets (Soveri, Rodriguez-Fornells, & Laine, 
2011; Anat & Brian, 2010). 
In addition, the Asian participants were bilingual while the British participants were 
not. Prior studies indicate that bilingual individuals can enjoy better executive control in 
processing, perhaps due to the demands of processing multiple languages and the need to 
engage language-specific inhibition processes when switching from one language to another 
(Rodriguez-Fornells, De Diego, & Muente, 2006). This may help Asian participants switch 
between tasks. In addition to this, there was a cross-over interaction across the tasks; Asian 
participants were faster to make emotion decisions than gender decisions while the 
British/White participants showed the opposite result. This interesting result may reflect 
cultural differences in dealing with the gender issues. In western societies, gender is 
signalled by external cues on faces - makeup, hairstyles and differences in facial structure 
that distinguish men and women, while in Asian cultures, particularly in Muslim societies, 
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gender is signaled by the dress code. This finding is consistent with the differential face 
processing between the contrasting cultures- Easterners rely on contextual cues while 
Westerners tend to use feature based processing of faces (Miyamoto, Yoshikawa, & 
Kitayama, 2011). This might be particularly the case in Muslim cultures where men and 
women wear different external ‘gender markers’. Hence, Asian participants may place less 
weight on facial features when making gender classifications. This may in turn slow gender 
decisions when these participants are presented only with faces (as here). 
6.5. Implicit processing of emotion 
The experiments in chapter 5 differed from the earlier ones in two ways. First, a different 
task-switching procedure was used, with tasks switched across short trial blocks (see Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995). I have already discussed the potential implications of this change for the 
effects of task switching. In addition, I varied whether there was a change or repeat of an 
irrelevant factor as different explicit tasks were performed (e.g., the emotion expression of 
the faces could vary as participants performed gender and occupation decisions). Here I 
found that variation in facial emotion affected gender and occupation decisions, and 
variation in gender affected emotion and occupation decisions. In contrast, varying the 
occupations of faces made minimal difference to emotion and gender classifications. This 
last set of results is consistent with emotion and gender being processed implicitly, while 
occupation information is not necessarily retrieved when faces are classified on other bases.  
There is prior evidence for implicit processing of facial emotion. Evidence comes 
from fMRI data showing greater activity in temporal lobe cortex when subjects attended to, 
and judged facial expression explicitly while implicit processing of expressions (when 
subjects attended to and judged gender among faces depicting happy and angry expression) 
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evoked greater activity in amygdala region (Critchley et al, 2000). In addition PET data, 
when subjects performed gender discrimination task among static grey-scale images of faces 
expressing sad and angry expressions, show an enhanced activity in the left amygdala and 
right temporal pole (Blair et al., 1999). Behavioural data support fMRI and PET data in 
suggesting implicit processing of identity and gender using Garner-type speeded 
classification task- for example, identity interferes with  emotion classification when 
subjects classified morphed faces along the dimension of emotion-happy/angry, with identity 
being irrelevant dimension- person A/B (Schweinberger, Burton, & Kelly, 1999) and gender 
interfered with the emotion classification when subjects classified faces along a emotion-
happy/fearful dimension with gender-male/female being irrelevant face dimension; Atkinson 
et al., 2005). Schweinberger and Soukup (1998) found same effects in Garner paradigm 
when subjects performed emotion categorization (happy/sad) among personally familiar 
faces, RTs were affected by identity (person A/B-task irrelevant dimension).  
I found evidence for implicit processing of gender as well as emotion. This result is 
counter to the argument that face gender is not classified automatically, at least for famous 
faces (Quinn, Mason, & Macrae, 2009) suggesting that implicit task switching effects may 
provide a particularly sensitive way to measure whether facial attributes are processed. 
These findings are consistent with the earlier report (Zhao et al., 2011, experiment 1) of 
facial emotion interfering with the task switching performance. In this study, face images 
posing fearful/neutral expression were presented as cues, with the gender of the faces 
indicating which task to do (classification of digit as either odd/even or high/low -more/less 
than 5), with the finding that the switch costs were larger in the trials containing fearful cues 
than in the trials containing neutral cues. For switch trials, when fearful faces were 
presented, RTs were longer than when neutral faces were presented while this effect did not 
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emerge on repeat trials. Note that here the digit has to be attended while the strength of my 
study is that a face has to be attended with the focus on gender and occupation 
classifications. These differential effects on switch trials may occur if participants then find 
it difficult to select the appropriate attribute of the face they are supposed to respond to, 
when the emotion change coincides with the task change. This was not found for changing 
the gender of the face here, though changing the gender did have an overall effect on 
emotion and occupation classifications (chapter 5), perhaps because the emotion change is 
more attentionally distracting. 
6.6. Implications 
The present work could have implications for understanding task switching in other contexts.  
A first application concerns the understanding of psychopathological behaviour, as for 
example, task switching can be difficult in patients with poor executive control (e.g., 
following frontal lobe damage) (Stablum et al., 2000). The present work demonstrated that 
executive control in task switching can improve after some blocks of practice. This has 
implications for training more generally and specifically for individuals with executive 
dysfunctions. The second application concerns the relations between switching ability and 
individual difference measures. The present results indicate that IQ is a core cognitive factor 
contributing to the ease of switching while EI is more involved with explicit emotion 
judgments. On the other hand, EI was not related to implicit variations in emotion. It may be 
that studies need to use implicit manipulations of emotion in order to lessen effects of EI on 
performance. On the other hand, if the interest is with whether individuals have EI, then 
explicit emotion decisions can tap into this. 
Another implication is that the studies can help us understand asymmetries in face 
categorization tasks. Asymmetries arise because one task is relatively difficult to switch 
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attention from (for example, facial expression for emotion judgments) than others (e.g., 
using information relevant to gender/occupation), and because some tasks are more sensitive 
to the build-up of performance when the task stays constant (e.g., emotion judgments). The 
factors that sustain such priming effects are currently little understood and this is a clear area 
for future research. 
There are also implications from the effects of culture in face categorization. There 
are differences between cultures particularly in dealing with gender and emotion. The factors 
behind this remain to be specified. For example, is the relative slow response of Asian 
participants to gender something that is specific to faces or might it be more general, 
affecting other aspects of gender classification (e.g., to clothes, to verbal descriptions)? Does 
this vary across different ages of participant? 
Finally, the results on the effects of implicit stimulus changes on task switching are 
of interest. It is noteworthy that changing the gender of faces affected performance here, 
whereas this has not always been found to be the case with famous individuals (Quinn, 
Mason, & Macrae, 2009). It may be that implicit processing may be revealed under 
conditions of task switching due (in part at least) to the executive demands placed on the 
participant. This could decrease executive control over stimulus processing, allowing effects 
of implicit processing of different facial attributes to emerge. For example, implicit social 
processing emerge when executive processes are loaded such as the effects of stereotype 
emerge more strongly when people have a task load (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 2006). 
This can be studied in future by more systematically varying the task load. 
6.7. Limitations 
There are several limitations concerning the present studies. 
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1. The present work is focused on categorization of happy expressions of emotions. 
This limits the generalizability of the results concerning to emotion categorization. 
The experiments should be extended to examine other emotions.  
2. Throughout the thesis RTs were relatively long. This is likely due to the 
administration of self-paced tasks, which may have left participants to adopting a 
relatively slow mode of responding. However, given that the thesis examined 
primarily the relative magnitudes of different variables, then variations in overall 
RTs may not be critical.  
3. The switching effects were examined under conditions of relatively long cue-
response/stimulus-response intervals. This can allow at least some ‘set-up’ to take 
place of the task set prior to the new stimulus appearing in the new task. For the 
generality of the results it will be important to examine the switching effects across a 
greater range of intervals. 
4. The experiments on individual differences in IQ and EI used relatively small 
numbers of participants, compared to large-scale analyses of individual differences. 
Though the numbers we reported were sufficient to generate effects, it will be 
important to conduct more extensive analyses in the future, to ensure that the 
interesting patterns of results remain the same. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1 
Pearson Correlations between mean Switch cost (emotion and gender task), NART VIQ, Bar 
On EQ-i and BarOn EQ-i Composite Scales Scores  
 SC NA EQ-i RAeq EReq SMeq GMeq ADeq 
         
SC - -.87** -.88** -.83** -.83** -.75** -.63** -.76* 
NA -.87** - .71** .67** .41 .51* .73** .68** 
EQ-i -.88** .71**    - .96** .96** .68** .76** .93** 
RAeq -.86** .63** .96** - .91** .71** .61* .85** 
EReq -.83** .67** .96** .91** - .56* .71** .89** 
SMeq -.75** .51* .68** .56* .56** - .34 .44 
GMeq -.63** .72** .76** .71* .71** .34 - .83** 
ADeq -.76** .68** .93** .89** .89** .44 .83** - 
 
Note. Read SC=switch cost, NA= NART VIQ, EQ-i= Total EI, RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, EReq= 
Interpersonal EI, SMeq= Stress management EI, GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= adaptability EI. 
**p<.01. *p  <.05. 
 
Table 1b 
Partial correlations (controlled for NART VIQ scores) between the Switch cost (emotion and 
gender task) and the BarOn EQ-i Composite Scales  
RAeq EReq SMeq GMeq ADeq 
 
 
-.84** 
 
-.68* 
 
-.74** 
 
-.01 
 
-.48 
 
Note. Read RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, EReq= Interpersonal EI, SMeq= Stress management EI,  
GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= Adaptability EI. **p<.001. *p  <.01. 
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Table 1c 
Mean (standard deviation) scores on BarOn EQ-i Composite Scales  
RAeq EReq SMeq GMeq ADeq 
 
 
95.00 (10.30) 
 
94.62 (9.52) 
 
91.43 (5.63) 
 
87.93 (3.06) 
 
94.12 (10.56) 
 
Note. Read RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, EReq= Interpersonal EI, SMeq= Stress management EI,  
GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= Adaptability EI. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 1 
Pearson Correlations between mean Switch cost (emotion and occupation task), NART VIQ, 
BarOn EQ-i and EQ-i Composite Scales  
 SC NA EQ-i RAeq EReq  SMeq          GMeq ADeq 
 
SC 
 
- 
 
-.80** 
 
-.80** 
 
-.81** 
 
-.54* 
 
-.78** 
 
-.62** 
 
-.70** 
NA -.80** - .65** .61* .41 .62* .63** .60* 
EQ-i -.80** .65** - .93** .76** .83** .62** .92** 
RAeq -.81** .61* .93** - .58* .87** .53* .86** 
EReq -.54* .41 .76** .58 - .35 .25 .52* 
SMeq -.78** .62* .83** .87** .35 - .80** .83* 
GMeq -.62** .63** .62** .53* .25 .80** - .64** 
ADeq -.70** .60* .92** .86** .52* .83** .64** - 
Note. Read SC= Total switch cost, NA=NART VIQ, EQ-i= Total EI, RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, 
EReq= Interpersonal EI, SMeq= Stress management EI, GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= 
Adaptability EI. **p<.01. *p  <.05. 
 
Table 1b 
Partial correlations (controlled for NART VIQ scores) between the Switch cost (emotion and 
occupation task) and the BarOn EQ-i Composite Scales  
RAeq EReq SMeq GMeq ADeq 
 
 
-.69* 
 
-.38 
 
-.60* 
 
-.23 
 
-.46 
 
Note. Read RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, EReq= Interpersonal EI, SMeq= Stress management EI,  
GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= Adaptability EI. *p  <.01. 
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Table 1c 
Mean (Standard Deviation) scores on EQ-i Composite Scales  
RAeq    EReq SMeq GMeq ADeq 
 
99.50 (10.16) 
 
96.56 (10.75) 
 
87.43 (2.18) 
 
90.18 (4.16) 
 
103.87 (11.98) 
 
Note.RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, EReq= Interpersonal EI, SMeq= Stress management EI,  
GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= Adaptability EI.  
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APPENDIX C 
Table 1 
Pearson Correlations between mean Switch cost (occupation and gender task), NART VIQ, 
BarOn EQ-i and EQ-i Composite Scales  
 SC NA EQ-i RAeq EReq   SMeq GMeq ADeq 
         
SC - -.79** -.30 -.25** -.08**      -.31* -.41 -.42 
NA -.79** - .30 .28 .10 .29 .31 .40 
EQ-i -.30 .30 - .95** .89** .85** .69** .89** 
RAeq -.25 .28 .95** - .84** .71** .63** .82** 
EReq -.08 .10 .89** .84** - .77** .53* .64** 
SMeq -.31 .29 .85** .71** .77** - .74** .77** 
GMeq -.41 .31 .69** .63** .53* .74**. -          .58** 
ADeq -.42 .40 .89** .82** .64** 77** .58*            - 
Note. Read SC=switch cost, NA=NART VIQ, EQ-i= Total EI, RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, EReq= Interpersonal EI,  
SMeq= Stress management EI, GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= adaptability EI.**p<.01. * p<.05. 
Table 1b 
Partial correlations (controlled for NART VIQ scores) between the Switch cost (occupation 
and gender task) and the BarOn EQ-i Composite Scales  
RAeq EReq SMeq GMeq ADeq 
 
 
-.04 
 
-.00 
 
-.14 
 
-.27 
 
-.19 
 
Note. Read RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, EReq= Interpersonal EI, SMeq= Stress management EI,  
GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= Adaptability EI.  
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Table 1c 
Mean (standard deviation) Scores on EQ-i Composite Scales  
RAeq EReq SMeq GMeq ADeq 
 
102.05 (7.76) 
 
99.31 (6.81) 
 
87.37 (1.96) 
 
87.62 (1.58) 
 
101.25 (7.13) 
 
Note. Read RAeq= Intrapersonal EI, EReq= Interpersonal EI, SMeq= Stress management EI,  
GMeq= General mood EI, ADeq= Adaptability EI. 
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APPENDIX D 
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